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Abstract 
Currently, oil and gas companies face dramatic challenges such as volatile prices, booming 
global demand, and reduced resources within existing fields, which combined with a 
substantial reduction of ice in the Arctic, is leading the exploration and production of oil into 
less developed parts of the world. In addition to these challenges the oil companies need to 
take into consideration that the complex equipment that is used for drilling rigs, oil 
platforms, especially in the Arctic is under a constant threat operating in harsh conditions 
offshore which can easily lead to environmental disasters. Therefore, it requires that the 
exploration and production (E&P) activities must be continued in an economically efficient 
and safe manner. Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are widely used in process facilities for 
controlling the process and mitigating the possible risks. An optimal design and operation 
of the SIS is essential for an effective performance that intended to reduce risk of hazards to 
acceptable levels. The objective of this research has been to address the problem of SIS 
design and maintenance modelling to optimize the set of safety measures inherent in the SIS 
and simultaneously to determine the staffing size and their working schedules as well as the 
maintenance policy for SIS performance. The multi-objective optimization of the SIS design 
and maintenance planning considered both safety and economic indicators in order to 
explore the trade-off between the cost of using safety measures and the obtained safety level 
for SIS performance. The modelling in this research is to ensure the safety of operations by 
simultaneously evaluating the decisions on the safety system`s components and structures, 
the facility maintenance frequencies, the staffing size of maintenance personnel and 
transportation of staff, as well as the schedules of their work shift. A Markov model applied 
for safety quantification, i.e. addressing the device failures and repairs, technological 
incidents and restorations, and the periodic maintenance policy, while a black-box 
optimization algorithm was used in the decision-making process. From the perspective of 
an engineering project, the results of this SIS design and maintenance planning, optimization 
should be valued at the stage of defining the requirements specification, helping to formulate 
rather clear functional safety requirements that can be further used as a starting point for the 
detailed engineering design of SIS.
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1.0 Introduction  
Over the last decades, demand and consumption of oil have been steadily increasing, while 
the crude oil has become one of the most present and essential resources in modern society 
(BP 2017). Today, the oil and gas (O&G) industry has a strong influence worldwide, and it 
is one of the most powerful branches in the world economy. Since activities in the modern 
society rely on to a huge extent on the hydrocarbons, oil and gas will still play a vital role in 
meeting the future energy demand. In fact, global proved oil reserves rose by 15 billion 
barrels (0, 9 %) to 1707 billion barrels in 2015, which estimated as 50, 6 years of global 
production based on production level of 2016 (BP 2017). According to the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS), an estimation of 22 % of the world`s undiscovered oil resources are in the 
Arctic, and roughly 84 % of these resources are expected to be found offshore (Milakovic, 
Ehlers and Schutz 2014).  
Currently, oil and gas companies face dramatic challenges such as volatile prices, booming 
global demand, and reduced resources within existing fields, which combined with a 
substantial reduction of ice in the arctic, is leading the exploration and production of oil into 
less developed parts of the world. In addition to these challenges the oil companies need to 
take into consideration that the complex equipment that is used for drilling rigs, oil 
platforms, especially in the Arctic is under a constant threat operating in harsh conditions 
offshore which can easily lead to environmental disasters. Since drilling has been taking 
place for hundreds of years, there have been numerous incidents, which had a serious impact 
on both personnel and the environment. Therefore, it requires that the exploration and 
production (E&P) activities must be continued in an efficient and safe manner.    
For this reason, the major challenges of oil and gas companies might be how to improve the 
safety and increase the business value in executing the operation in remote and harsh 
environments in the years ahead. In practice, the technologies used to produce oil and gas 
and further processing are associated with substantial hazards. The whole chain of oil and 
gas processes from the field to the end user, is carried out on the hazardous industrial 
facilities where the occurrence of an incident may lead to significant economic losses, harm 
to personnel, environmental damage, and other negative consequences. Thus, a proper 
design of safety systems and maintenance planning can contribute significantly to the safety 
of operations on such hazardous facilities (Redutskiy 2017a).  
 
The thesis will describe the design of safety instrumented systems (SIS), and their 
maintenance planning and workforce scheduling for remotely located oil and gas (O&G) 
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facilities. The maintenance planning is considered within the framework of an O&G 
industry-engineering project. The structure of the thesis is as follows. The section1.0 
provides some background information and motivation for the research problem. The section 
2.0 provides a brief overview of main theoretical frameworks for the research. The section 
3.0 describes the research methodology used in the research. The section 4.0 presents the 
mathematical structure and description of the models that are constructed for the research. 
The section 5.0 presents the computational experiment. The section 6.0 presents the obtained 
results from the computational experiment. The section 7.0 provides the conclusion of this 
research and recommendations for future research. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
The technology of oil and gas production, processing, transportation and distribution is a 
complex combination of technical solutions and information technology solutions (Devold 
2013). The former category includes technological units and facilities running the processes. 
The information technology (IT) solution consisting of various automated process control 
systems and safety systems, as well as servers, operators’ and engineers’ workstations 
connected into an industrial network. From the strategic planning perspective, the 
engineering projects for such technological solutions development include a number of 
decisions related to these systems design with a long-term view of facilities functioning. 
These decisions are related to the design of specific processes (facilities and units), choices 
of instrumentation and architectures for the process control systems and safety-related 
systems, industrial network hardware, as well as choices of software (interface) for the 
workstations, database management system and so on. 
The focus of this research is development and operation of automated safety systems. These 
systems are crucial for the petroleum industry processes given the hazardous nature of the 
technology. The decision related to the safety systems design include the architectures and 
the instrumentation choices for the system’s components. These constitute mostly to the 
capital investments into the safety systems. In addition to these decisions, the expenditures 
related to operating (maintaining) the safety systems will be considered in detail. This is 
especially relevant given that O&G industry is facing a shift towards the operations in 
nonconventional environments and remote locations, so that the processes in such conditions 
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would run smoothly and would be economically efficient. One of these planning issues is 
obviously related to the facilities’ personnel and their transportation to the remote locations 
and back. The examples of the remote locations may include the offshore petroleum 
production (and thereby offshore platforms), or oilfields in the north of Canada or gas fields 
in the Russian Arctic region. The facilities built in these locations are quite far from large 
cities or industrial centers, and therefore they are poorly attainable by the conventional road, 
railway or air transportation. The transportation means to such regions often involves 
helicopters (for Arctic locations) and supply vessels (for offshore locations). The personnel 
involved in deploying these facilities and operating them is transported from the cities where 
the engineering companies are actually located and remain at the production sites during a 
certain period. Thus, scheduling the trips and work shifts for personnel is a very important 
aspect of planning the operations. 
 
1.2 Incidents in oil and gas industry  
The petroleum industry is potentially one of the most hazardous industry sectors worldwide. 
Because the operations the petroleum sector is running, is involving combination of serious 
complex equipment, toxic, flammable, and explosive materials, and processes that are under 
high pressure can lead to hazardous incidents, besides dealing with numerous environmental 
hazards.  During the past decades, the industry has had several serious incidents with a major 
accident. A major accident is an acute incident (e.g., a major discharge/emission or a 
fire/explosion etc.), which immediately or subsequently causes several serious injuries and 
in some cases loss of human life, serious harm to the environment as well as loss of 
substantial material assets (PSA 2013).  Thus, investigations of major accidents show that 
technical, human, operational, as well as organizational factors influence the accident 
sequences. Despite these facts, quantitative risk analyses of oil and gas production facilities 
have mostly focused on technical safety systems (Vinnem, et al. 2012).  
In addition, increasing energy demand is driving the exploration and production in oil and 
gas industry more and more to the non-conventional environments (remote locations, deep-
water, harsh climate conditions). As a result, safety and prevention of hazardous incidents 
are becoming a big challenge for the operators. One type of unwanted hazardous events that 
may be named here is vapor cloud explosions. They occur due to the release of flammable 
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gases and ignition (Dadashzadeh, et al. 2013). The unwanted release of a combustible gas 
or liquid may result in an explosive vapor cloud, which upon ignition forms a threat to the 
surrounding area (Wiekema 1984). Perhaps, accounting for the causes and the outcomes of 
such a hazardous event may help to design the safety measures that could prevent such an 
event and/or mitigate its consequences (Dadashzadeh, et al. 2013). Another kind of 
unwanted events in the petroleum sector is hydrocarbon leaks which have a major accident 
potential (Skogdalen and Vinnem 2012). 
The research on several major incidents in oil and gas industry shows that the following 
events are defined essentially as vapor cloud explosions due to dispersion of the flammable 
gases. Piper Alpha, 1988: an explosive inferno on the UK platform claimed the lives of 167 
people after a gas leak ignited (PSA 2013).  Investigations revealed the release of light 
hydrocarbons (condensate propane, butane, and pentane) occurred due to the restart of a 
pump that was out of service for maintenance (CCPS 2005). BP Texas City, 2005: a series 
of explosions and fires occurred due to hydrocarbon liquid leak at BP`s Texas City oil 
refinery during the startup of an isomerization (ISOM) process unit that had been shut down 
for maintenance, which claimed 15 lives and caused much serious injuries (Kaszniak and 
Holmstrom 2008). Petrobras, 2001: a major explosion occurred on the Petrobras platform 
36 claimed the lives of 11 people (USEPA 2001). Investigation revealed the accident started 
by the rupture of an Emergency Drain Tank (EDT) because of excessive overpressure that 
caused a gas leak ignition (Barusco 2002). BP Deepwater Horizon, 2010: an explosion and 
consequent fire resulted in the loss of 11 lives. Investigation showed that the explosion 
happened due to a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from the Macondo 
well onto the Transocean`s Deepwater Horizon rig, resulting in a fire on the rig (BP 2010). 
In addition, the blowout caused oil spill out of damaged well for two months, the worst 
environmental disaster of all time (USDI 2010).  
In O&G industry, lesson learned from such major accidents are important sources of 
information to prevent the occurrence of similar accidents in the future, and leading to 
significant changes in technology, operations, supervision, and regulation (Skogdalen and 
Vinnem 2012). As well as recognizing signals and or warnings by using proactive safety 
indicators will reduce the risk of such major accidents (Øien, Utne and Herrera 2011). 
Investigations of the hydrocarbon releases, releases often reveal that these events are 
originate in either failure of a certain asset itself or because of mistakes in the asset’s 
maintenance, e.g., poor practice or insufficient operational controls. As shown in examples 
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above, the consequences of major accidents are quite severe. One of the factors contributing 
to preventing major accidents is proper maintenance of production facilities (HSE 2014).  
 
1.3 Oil and Gas facilities in remote locations 
 
 
Figure 1: The main function of O&G facility Based on: [ (PetroWiki n.d.)] 
 
An oil and gas facility encompasses the equipment between the wells and the pipelines or 
other transportation systems, and its purpose is to produce oil and gas and to make petroleum 
ready for sale according to the customers’ requirements, e.g. limitations to percentage of 
allowable water, salt, and other impurities. The main process of an oil and gas facility is to 
separate the oil, gas, water, and solids and deliver it to the transportation system for further 
processes. In general, the processing facilities in the petroleum industry are technically 
complex, involving the integration of knowledge from many different technical and socio-
economical disciplines (Berendes 2007). The technology of hydrocarbons is associated with 
high risks. Today, the risk level is increasing because the industry has faced with even more 
challenges ahead for operating deeper, colder, more remote locations (e.g., offshore, deep 
sea, arctic, etc.). 
Over the last decade, oil and gas companies are ventured into remote areas (i.e. places to be 
situated far from the main centers of population; distant) to operate their exploration and 
production activities due to attainable oil and gas reserves. In many instances, extracting oil 
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in these remote areas might be challenging due to lack of infrastructure development and 
integration, optimization and systems management, and maintenance for optimal 
performance of operations. Beside this, the oil and gas companies need to handle the rapidly 
increasing technological complexity of the industrial production processes and complexity 
of establishing and maintaining facilities and units for production processes in remote and 
poorly accessible locations (Zolotukhin, Sungurov and Streletskaya 2015). 
 
1.4 Safety System in oil and gas facilities 
The relationship between hazards, threats, consequences as well as potential safety barriers 
and controls, illustrated in a diagram, in Figure 2. This diagram is called a “bow-tie diagram” 
and it includes two parts: the left side describes the latent hazard, initiating events, 
preventive controls, and initial hazard release, while the right-hand side presents the 
potential major incident as a starting point, barriers in sequence and the consequences that 
result from the failure of the barriers. Altogether, the bow-tie diagram allows identifying the 
safety barriers, more discussion in section 2.1.1, implemented to prevent the critical event 
from taking place and as well to mitigate its effects. Admittedly, the bow-tie diagram is a 
special case of safety barrier diagrams. Safety barrier diagrams have proven to be a useful 
tool in documenting the safety measures taken to prevent incidents in oil and gas industry 
(Duijm 2008).  
Usually, several safety systems used in the oil and gas facilities to providing several layers 
of protection. These safety systems are designed as a series of barriers protecting the 
personnel, facility assets, environment, etc. Among all these safety measures, there are 
automated systems, which are usually referred to as Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), and 
there are safety measures of another nature (emergency response policy, evacuation plans, 
etc.). Among SIS, special attention is paid to Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems as they 
play a vital role in preventing the hazardous situations occurrence (CCPS 2010). The ESD 
systems monitor the processes and shut down the technology in circumstances that can 
quickly lead to emergency situations with drastic consequences, related to, e.g., uncontrolled 
flooding, escape of hydrocarbons, or outbreak of fire in hydrocarbon carrying areas. Safety 
of the processes in oil and gas industry is a matter of concern, as the equipment and the 
processes are rather complex and considered to be hazardous.  
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The requirements to the functional safety (i.e. the overall safety of a certain system) of 
operations at such facilities are an important part of development of the oil and gas industrial 
solutions. The purpose of the safety requirements is to manage the risk of operating a 
hazardous system. The safety measures are developed so that the overall functional safety 
would correspond to a certain acceptable level by introducing a set of safety-related 
functions (Piesik, Sliwinski and Barnert 2016). For this reason, SISs are installed in oil and 
gas facilities to detect hazardous events (i.e. to prevent damage to the facility and risk for 
personnel), and to perform required safety actions to maintain the process return to a safe 
state (Lundteigen and Rausand 2008). Therefore, a proper design of SIS is imperative for 
safe operations. During last decades, the importance of safety systems has been increasing 
in the oil and gas industry (Lundteigen 2008). As can be seen, the safety plays a vital role in 
this industry because failures can have dramatic consequences.  
 
1.5  Life Cycle Approach to the Systems Development in Oil and 
Gas Projects 
In the petroleum sector, building any particular technological solution is done in the form of 
an engineering project comprising the choice of the necessary processes design for 
implementing the appropriate technology, and also, establishing an IT system to work 
Figure 2: Barriers for major accidents in O&G industry Source: [ (Skogdalen and Vinnem 2012)] 
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closely with the technology to control the processes and ensure the proper course of 
operations. These IT solutions include (Figure 3): 
 
 process automation tools such as sensors, programmable logic controllers (PLCs, 
or, in other words, industrial computers), valves, drives, switches, etc. 
 common IT systems components, such as workstation computers (for operators and 
IT engineers and technology engineers), servers, and communication networks. 
 
 
Figure 3: Process automation and IT system at an O&G facility    Source: [ (Devold 2013)] 
 
The process automation of the engineering solution depicted in Figure 3 includes such 
elements as a general process control system (sometime also referred to as distributed 
control systems), system of interlocks, emergency shutdown system, fire and gas detection 
system, firefighting systems and others (Devold 2013). Development of complex and 
multifunctional IT solutions is usually guided by systems development life cycle approach 
(SDLC), which has for several decades been the underlying methodology for many 
approaches to establishing information systems of various nature (Avison and Fitzgerald 
2003). SDLC focuses on the phases of development and implementation of computer-based 
systems. The starting phase is related to project initiation (which includes feasibility study 
and investigation of current systems).   
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The next step is development of requirements specification to the new system that is further 
designed according to the requirements. Upon the design completion, it is implemented, and 
finally, the longest-running phase of the system’s lifecycle, namely, operations and 
maintenance, takes place. The specifics of the systems developed for oil and gas industry 
imply that the following is done during each of the mentioned life cycle phases. The project 
initiation is often considered to be a phase of conceptual design of a certain solution. At this 
very first stage, the appropriateness of a particular technology for the required purposes is 
always evaluated. As for the IT and process control solutions, current technical options 
(instrumentation alternatives for sensors, valves, controllers, switches, etc., industrial 
network solutions, servers and workstations hardware) as well as software options are 
studied and evaluated. Companies who intend to operate the facilities and systems under 
development initiate the conceptual design phase. These are usually large national or 
international companies making long-term investments, and thereby assuming a large risk. 
Examples of such companies are Statoil, BP, Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Gazprom, 
Rosneft, PetroChina, Petrobras, etc. These companies are often referred to as Exploration 
and Production (E&P) operators, or simply operating companies.  
When it comes to building new facilities, it is a common practice for the operating 
companies to assign the engineering workload to a contractor. The contractor is often chosen 
through a bidding process when several engineering contractor companies propose a certain 
design development. In the bidding process, certain pre-defined design requirements must 
be provided as an equal basis for all the participants, it is usually given due to budget 
purposes. When a contractor company is chosen, the following work on the engineering 
design is delegated to this company. Before the contractor begins the work, however, the 
operating company together with the contractor have to agree on the requirements 
specification, an essential document containing a set of requirements to the system under 
development, and the contractor must fulfill these requirements. 
Requirements specification is an important phase of the project’s lifecycle and it is 
especially important for the systems developed for the petroleum sector. This specification 
has to cover all aspects of the information system as the one depicted in Figure 3, including 
the functional safety requirements. This is important due to the danger that the oil and gas 
facilities and processes pose and the severity of the consequences in case of unwanted events 
occurrence. The importance of requirements specification in reference to the safety systems 
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development is highlighted in (HSE 2003). The British agency Health and Safety Executive 
conducted an analysis of a sample of incidents and their circumstances. Their study revealed 
that a significant share of incidents had been caused by the inadequacies in the requirement 
specification of the control systems responsible for the safety operations, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Primary causes of incidents grouped by the life cycle phase   Based on: [ (HSE 2003)] 
 
The safety requirements consist of two main categories as follows. First, one is functional 
safety requirements, which are the safety requirements related to the intended purpose of the 
facility or equipment, e.g., to ensure the facility or equipment maintain a safe state. In other 
words, explicit descriptive specification of safety functions needed to the incidents on the 
processes or failures of the instrumentation. Another one is safety integrity requirements that 
are related to the overall performance of the developed solution. The latter is expressed in a 
form of a number called the safety integrity level (SIL) which varies from 1 to 4, and is 
assigned to a particular system implementation given the likelihoods of incidents during the 
system’s functioning and the likelihood of the safety systems failure. Any automated system 
(including safety systems) may fail to implement their indented functions due of to various 
reasons. This is why the safety measures that are inherent in any automated control system 
include (a) choice of instrumentation with high reliability indicators, (b) development of an 
architecture that prove to be fault-tolerant, and (c) avoiding mistakes in the design process 
(HSE 2003).  
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The requirement specification with respect to safety requirements are associated with 
regulations expressed in the international standards IEC (International Electronical 
Commission). The design and operation of any automated safety system must follow the 
requirements declared in the standards IEC 61508 (1997) and IEC 61511 (2003), which are 
widely adopted by the national authorities for the oil and gas industry worldwide.  
The IEC 61508 is a generic standard on SIS design and construction. The IEC 61511 is a 
process industry safety standard that addresses the development of safety requirements for 
all safety instrumented systems (Hauge, Lundteigen and Rausand 2009). A careful 
qualitative analysis of safety measures (i.e. risk analysis) has to be conducted for particular 
solutions under development, so that the safety integrity level may be defined and 
documented in the requirements (IEC61511 2003).  
Risk analysis of the processes and technology in the petroleum industry (most of which is 
are typical and studied) result in knowledge regarding potential hazards, their likelihoods 
and their consequences, as well as the necessary protection layers. (Esparza and Hochleitner 
2010). This knowledge contributes to creating the requirements specification and helps 
ensuring the proper performance of the systems. However, the incident analysis conducted 
by HSE (2003) suggests that accounting for all possible critical situations and their 
consequences while designing a safety system, is a particularly complicated task. Given that, 
it is proposed that all safety systems should to be frequently reviewed through the system’s 
operations.  
Another important aspect of developing requirements specifications for safety-related 
systems and their functions is taking into account the viewpoints of all stakeholders involved 
in the projects in oil and gas industry. These stakeholders are (1) national authorities which 
are, first of all, in charge of the natural resources, including hydrocarbons that are extracted 
on the countries’ territories, and also the authorities perform their regulatory function by 
setting the standards for the operations at the hazardous industrial facilities, (2) E&P 
operator companies who invest into developing the hydrocarbon deposits, building the 
processing, transportation and distribution facilities, and (3) engineering contractors who are 
developing the facilities, units and the process control and IT solutions for particular 
projects. Figure 5 demonstrates the phases of the systems development lifecycle and the key 
stakeholders (along with their responsibilities) throughout the engineering project of 
establishing a certain solution or a facility oil and gas industry. 
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Figure 5: Stakeholders in oil and gas engineering projects.  Based on: [ (Yoset 2017) and (Redutskiy 2017b)] 
 
Fulfilling the requirements, the detailed engineering design of the solution is conducted by 
the contractor company. In the next stages, the technological solutions are commissioned 
and tested at the facilities and prepared for the operations. Still, the contractors are 
responsible for the solution’s design and providing further service and maintenance 
according to the contract. The system’s testing is conducted to confirm that the installed 
system is safe and complies with the requirements; otherwise, it is mandatory to run changes 
in the safety system design (Esparza and Hochleitner 2010).  
In addition, important to realize that the contractors who develop the engineering solutions 
including the necessary safety systems have their own angle in the engineering design 
context (Redutskiy 2017a). As mentioned before, the contractors participate in bidding 
competitions to get the hired for their services. Therefore, their proposed solutions should 
be cheap to be attractive to the hiring operating company. Such solutions can lead to 
redesigning the safety systems later in the stages. Then the stakeholders of the project will 
give permission to start up such solutions or reject.  
In any case, the requirements specification documents, especially its part concerning the 
safety requirements, will provide the design basis for developed automated safety systems. 
Therefore, it is essential that vendors and subcontractors of the engineering contractors 
verify that assumptions specified in the requirements specification document are in complete 
agreement with the specifications of their products. Any operational, functional, and 
environmental limitations related to various subsystems or components which do not 
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satisfies the requirements must be identified and brought to the attention of the engineering 
contractor and the operator (NOGA 2004). In general, the overall objective of safety system 
design, implementation, and maintenance is to ensure that the system is able to perform the 
intended safety functions if or when a specific process demand for it (in other words, a 
technological incident) should occur (Lundteigen and Rausand 2008).  
The safety systems design is associated with the choice of certain devices among the options 
available, choice of certain instrumentation architectures, decisions on introducing 
additional safety measures, and planning the maintenance of facilities as well as 
instrumentation systems (Redutskiy 2017a). It is impossible to design an industrial system 
that could be maintenance-free due to the technical limitations (Markeset and Kumar 2001). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to achieve a balance between the investments into the safety 
system’s complexity and the maintenance expenses by using life cycle viewpoint when the 
design of a safety system is conducted (Moss 1985).  
Design, operations, and maintenance of a safety system installed at an oil and gas facility 
(or any hazardous technology) are associated with expenditures throughout the entire life 
cycle of the designed system. Major parts of the overall life cycle costs are: the procurement 
(or purchasing) costs, costs of the systems operations (energy consumption and the system’s 
maintenance), and finally, risk costs. The maintenance of SIS is executed in two ways such 
as (1) continuously during the operation and (2) periodically in the form of proof tests (i.e. 
interval tests), which implies shutting down the processes for a certain period to fix all the 
failures that could not be fixed while the system is running.  
Conducting maintenance is associated with costs of staff, maintenance tools, spare parts, and 
facility downtime (production losses) for the duration of the proof tests (Redutskiy 2017a). 
The economic perspective of planned maintenance is, first, to minimize the total cost of 
inspections and repairs, and second, to reduce the systems downtime, e.g., as measured in 
loss of production or reduced production quality (Eti, Ogaji and Probert 2007). These points 
are essential for the projects in oil and gas sector, because the stakeholders e.g. government, 
E&P operators and other companies involved in the development of new industrial facilities 
and infrastructure expect the overall profit. Thus, the operating companies’ concern is about 
the capital costs of deploying the new facilities and setting up the automated systems, and 
at the same time, one of the priorities is smooth operation (i.e. less facility downtime) 
throughout the timespan of the systems operations in order to ensure profitability of their 
projects. To conclude this section, it should be pointed out that an automated safety system 
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is as safety barrier that is crucial for any hazardous technology. A safety system that is poorly 
designed may fail to prevent technological incidents that may have serious consequences, 
such as destruction of the process facilities and assets, as well as harm to the staff involved 
in the operations. Another problem that an improper design often causes is spurious 
activation of the safety instrumentation (Wang, et al. 2016). The spurious activations of SIS 
in oil and gas industry lead to production loss and stress on affected components and 
systems. Then  a partial or full process shutdown and hazards during system restoration and 
start-up (Lundteigen and Rausand 2008), as well as loss of confidence to the SIS, and more 
undesired events due to the increased number of shutdowns and start-ups (Lundteigen 2008). 
Thus, it is important to design the system solutions properly. Therefore, an appropriate 
design method should aim to avoid of failure actions and spurious activation and to ensure 
the overall safety of operations.  
 
1.6 Research Purpose and Value 
The purpose of this research is to provide firstly a better understanding of the reasonable 
recommendations for the organizational measures concerning the safety system for remotely 
located oil and gas (O&G) facilities. Secondly, optimizing the safety system design and the 
safety instrumented system maintenance problem with a focus on the details of maintenance 
through workforce scheduling. With this, the relevant issues as the maintenance staff size, 
duration of maintenance personnel trips and shifts, and transportation of the personnel to 
and from the facilities remotely located, and the frequencies of maintenance services for the 
facilities. The research questions are further detailed in the research design methodology 
section, 3.2.  
 
The objective of the thesis is to address the problem of optimizing the set of safety 
measures inherent in safety instrumented system (SIS) together with the approach to the 
SIS maintenance through workforce scheduling. From the perspective of an engineering 
project, the results of this SIS design and maintenance planning optimization should be 
valuable at the stage of defining the requirements specification, helping to formulate 
rather clear functional safety requirements, which can be further used as a starting point 
for the detailed engineering design of SIS.  
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2.0 Theoretical frameworks 
The literature review provides a brief overview of main theoretical frameworks. These are 
(1) Risk reduction, (2) Reliability Theory, (3) Asset Management, (4) optimization Theory. 
The (3) and (4) are discussed under the section research methodology.    
2.1 Risk reduction 
2.1.1 Safety Barriers 
Safety is defined as the absence of unwanted events, which essentially means as the absence 
of risk, thus, a higher level of safety is either to prevent from the unwanted events or to 
protect against their consequences (Hollnagel 2004), as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Safety through prevention and protection    Source: [ (Hollnagel 2008)] 
 
According to Reason (1990), accidents mostly happen due to a combination of an 
unexpected event and a dysfunctional or missing barrier, rather than to a single initiating 
action. There are various measures to reduce accidents. Safety barriers are widely used as 
measures (Hollnagel 2004). Sklet (2006) defines the terms as safety barrier, barrier function, 
and barrier system as following: 
“Safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, control, or 
mitigate undesired events or accidents. A barrier function is a function planned to prevent, 
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control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. A barrier system is a system that has been 
designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier functions.” 
 
Further, a barrier element is a component or a subsystem of a barrier system that by itself 
cannot perform a barrier function. A barrier subsystem may consist of several redundant 
barrier elements (Sklet 2006), this is in the case of safety system design, e.g. instrumentation 
as subsystems represented by their M-out-of-N (MooN) redundancies 2.1.4.2 , (IEC 61508 
2010). A barrier system may comprise different types of system elements, e.g., physical, and 
technical elements such as hardware and software, operational activities executed by humans 
as well (Sklet 2006). However, all different safety barriers are used to reduce risks, and they 
are divided into two groups as passive and active barrier, further as physical, technical, and 
human/operational barrier, shown in Figure 7. Each safety barrier itself contains several 
elements, and reliability block diagrams can describe the behavior of the elements. Because 
reliability block diagrams are often used for documenting redundancy in safety systems 
(Duijm 2008). 
 
Figure 7: Classification of barriers   Source: [ (Jin 2013, Sklet 2006)] 
The SISs are technical active safety barriers. In oil and gas industry, e.g., safety barriers 
introduced to prevent hydrocarbon releases, and a new method for qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis of the hydrocarbon release frequency on oil and gas platforms 
introduced in (Sklet 2006). To conclude, all SISs are among the most important and effective 
safety barriers in reducing the likelihood of hazardous events and mitigating their serious 
consequences (Jin 2013). 
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2.1.2 Safety Instrumented Systems  
Safety Instrumented Systems are widely used in process facilities for controlling the process 
and mitigating the possible risks. SISs are frequently used in the petroleum industry to detect 
hazardous events e.g. gas leakages and high-pressures (Hauge, Lundteigen and Rausand 
2009). The standard ISA S84.01 defines SIS, as “SIS is a distinct, reliable system used to 
safeguard a process to prevent a catastrophic release of toxic, flammable, or explosive 
chemicals.” (ISA 1997). Similarly, the standard IEC 61508 defines SIS, as “SIS is a system 
composed of sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements for the purpose of taking a 
process to a safe state, when predetermined conditions are violated.” (IEC 61508 1998). 
The standard IEC 61511 defines SIS as an “instrumented system used to implement one or 
more safety instrumented functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of sensors, logic 
solver, and final elements” (IEC 61511 2003). Another definition of SIS in (Gruhn and 
Cheddie 1998) as “safety instrumented systems are those designed to respond to conditions 
of a plant that may be hazardous in themselves or if no action were taken could eventually 
give rise to a hazard. They must generate the correct outputs to prevent the hazard or 
mitigate the consequences”. 
In the process industry, all instruments installed in the process facility are entitled with the 
generic name of field of instruments, e.g. sensors, final elements, transmitters, valves, etc. 
(A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). In addition, logic solvers are Electrical (E)/Electronic 
(E)/Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) components or subsystems that execute the 
application logic, including input/output modules. Electrical refers to logic functions 
performed by electromechanical techniques, electronic refers to logic functions performed 
by electronic techniques, and programmable electronic system refers to logic performed by 
programmable or configurable devices e.g. Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) (ISA 
1997). The duty of the input elements (e.g. sensors and transmitters) is to detect hazardous 
events, the logic solver is for deciding what to do, and the final control elements is to perform 
according to the algorithm in PLC (IEC 61508 1998). The PLC for SIS is a computer-based 
system that executing the safety functions to provide control capability, and communications 
systems for interfacing to other systems. The sensors can be varied according to the required 
measurements e.g., conventional transmitters; the sensor is connected to an electronic device 
that amplifies and transmits an analogue signal representing the measured variable. As well 
as the final control elements are varied, and the most common for safety systems are valves, 
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electric motors, and alarm devices. Their reliability depends on their design and the actuator 
used to command it (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009).  
 
2.1.3 System protection layers 
Figure 8: Protection layers on a process facility     Source: [ (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009)] 
A layer of protection is a measure put in place as a defense to reduce the risk presented by 
the facility. Generally, all process facilities have more than one protection layers performing 
its function in a hierarchical manner for maintaining the safe state of the facility if the 
previous protection layer has failed to protect, Figure 8 (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). It 
requires several SISs (e.g. ESD system, Pressure relief devices, and Fire & Gas detection 
system) must be installed providing multiple protections for ensuring the facility. In O&G 
industry, SISs are the most important and critical protection layers that are installed on the 
oil and gas facilities for reducing risks to a minimum level by detecting hazardous events 
and prevent them from their consequences (Chang, et al. 2015). They are named after their 
main functions as emergency shutdown (ESD) systems, process shutdown (PSD) systems, 
high integrity pressure protection (HIPPS) systems, and fire and gas (F&G) detection 
systems. These systems play an important role in the petroleum industry as well as in the 
other process industries (Lundteigen 2008). According to CCPS, Centre for Chemical 
Process Safety (2010), among all SISs, the ESD systems ensure the most significant risk 
reduction because they respond to highly critical situations where hazards with significant 
consequences. Thus, it is very important that the safety systems, especially the ESD systems 
must have a proper design to perform their functions correctly in any operations. 
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2.1.4 Safety Instrumented System Design 
Referring to the standards (IEC 61508 1998, IEC 61511 2003), a general structure of SIS 
can be represented by a control loop, shown in Figure 9. The design of SIS requires 
achievement of safety integrity. The safety integrity requirements define the minimum levels 
of safety integrity and include the restriction of the safety system probability of failure on 
demand (PFDavg) to a maximum target limit and the minimum levels of fault tolerance (IEC 
61508 2010). The fault tolerance is the capacity of a safety system to prevent single faults 
escalating into system failures that usually achieved by some form of redundancy (e.g. 
hardware and software redundancy).  
Figure 9: Structure of SIS, introduced by IEC 61508 & IEC 61511   Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
 
The standards IEC61508 (1998) and IEC61511 (2003) highlighted that redundancy is one 
of measures that ensure a certain level of safety with regard to the SIS design. Then, several 
identical redundant components may be sensitive to stress factors that may lead to all 
components fail at the same time (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009).  
Another measure is the introduction of additional electrical and physical separation of the 
devices in each subsystem to mitigate the phenomenon of common-cause failure (CCF), 
which occurs when all the components of a subsystem fail simultaneously (IEC 61508 
1998). Therefore, the technologies of diversity are used for mitigating the problem of CCF, 
while using identical redundancy to address the problem of random failures in the system 
(A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). In the event of a SIS failure, the purpose of SIS is to force 
the process in to its fail-safe condition, where the presence of harm is eliminated (W. E. 
Anderson 2005). For instance, a control valve moves to its fail-open or fail-close condition 
depending on the SIS design, thereby the ultimate objective of designing SIS is to comply 
with the requirements of safety integrity level (SIL) (Gabriel 2017).  
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The process of determining SIL is described in the standard (IEC 61508 2010), and it is 
based on the risk assessment. The risk is known as a combination of probability or frequency 
of dangerous event occurrence and its consequences. The safety systems must achieve high 
levels of dependability (Laprie 1992), thus the reliability and availability of safety related 
systems need to compliance with the required specifications. A challenge for SIS designers 
is to balance the SIS reliability with the performing proof tests, which are important means 
to reveal SIS failures, because performing proof tests is associated with costs of labor and 
tools as well as production losses due to facility downtime for the duration of the tests. 
Furthermore, there are many requirements from authorities, oil companies, and international 
standards, given to the engineering contractors when it comes to the design of safety 
systems. Thus, the engineering contractors may use the safety life cycle model, which is 
introduced in the standard IEC61508 (1998), as basis for their product development.  
In addition, a non-optimal SIS design can be caused by (1) overdesigned and (2) under 
designed structures. An overdesigned SIS results in more initial cost, more operation and 
maintenance cost, and higher spurious trip rate leading to less safety. On the other hand, 
there will be no safety requirements compliance at all if a SIS under designed. In such cases, 
the designed SIS can achieve at least the minimum level of safety integrity, SIL 1, but most 
likely the system will result in a low availability due to depending on the components 
reliability (Esparza and Hochleitner 2010). Consequently, such insufficient specification of 
requirements to SIS design often resulting in the development of a solution that marginally 
ensures the required level of safety (HSE 2003). Therefore, an optimal design and operation 
of SIS is essential for an effective performance, which intended to reduce risk of hazards to 
acceptable levels. A SIS must follow a safety life cycle to ensure that the required 
dependability level is achieved and maintained properly during its entire operating lifetime. 
This is mainly devised and executed during its design (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). 
 
2.1.4.1 Fault Tolerance for SIS 
There are two approaches such as fault prevention and fault tolerance, discussed by some 
authors. Laprie (1992) stated, “Fault prevention intends to avoid faults occurring or being 
introduced into the system, while fault tolerance is a measure to prevent that faults that take 
place during service provoking a system failure”.  Similarly, in (Jalote 1994) mentioned as 
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“fault prevention methods focus on methodologies for design, testing, and validation; 
whereas fault tolerant methods focus on how to use components in a manner that such 
failures can be masked”. In safety related systems, the fault tolerance (FT) is achieved by 
using redundancy. A system is fault tolerant if it can prevent the system from the occurrence 
of faults by means of redundancy e.g., connecting two transmitters in parallel provides some 
degree of fault tolerance (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009), which is fundamental against 
dangerous failures in safety systems. The most used form of redundancy is the parallel 
structure (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 2012).  
There are three ways to implement redundancies in the safety systems: (1) passive (i.e. static) 
that means it requires no extra actions to take for preventing the faults from resulting in 
further failures, (2) active (i.e. dynamic) that relies on taking some action to detect faults for 
removing the faults from the system, and (3) hybrid, which is a combination of (1) and (2), 
according to (Storey 1996).  The fault tolerance is used mostly for computer systems. And 
SISs can be defined as safety computer system, because the logic solvers of SIS are 
computers (i.e. industrial computers). For the oil and gas facilities, fault tolerance is 
implemented when redundancy is added to the field instruments e.g. valves, measurement 
devices, etc.  
 
2.1.4.2 Voting architectures for SIS 
In process industry, SIS architecture is practically limited to parallel and majority voting 
architectures with small number of component e.g. up to four (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 
2009).  Basis redundancy architecture of SIS, regarding field instruments, is presented in 
(Gruhn and Cheddie 1998) as for sensors the architectures 1oo1D, 1oo2D and 2oo3, and for 
final control elements 1oo1, 1oo2 and 2oo2. The architectures with D are the voting 
architectures with diagnostics (MooND), which indicate that the diagnostic circuit added for 
logic solvers for modifying the voting output of the system to convert dangerous failures 
into safe failures. Several dependability models for PES for some architectures with 
diagnostics as 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo1D, 2oo3, 2oo2D, and 1oo2D, developed by (W. Goble 
1998), which later used as practical process examples.  Another most common voting 
architectures is identified in (CCPS 2007) as for sensors 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, and 2oo3, for 
logic solver 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, and 2oo3, and for final control elements 1oo1, 1oo2, and 
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2oo2. In some cases, there will be such architecture 2ooN, where N is a large number. This 
is not a common architecture, but it can be for “where the unacceptable process condition 
can occur in multiple distinct locations,” (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009).   
In addition, the standard IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511 (IEC 61511 2003) present these 
architectures, 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2, 1oo2D, and 2oo3 under the name of MooN (M-out-of-N) 
systems. The standard IEC 61508 (2010) provides an analysis how to obtain simplified 
equations by means of Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) for the above-mentioned 
architectures. A definition of the MooN system is given in IEC61511 (2003): “Safety 
Instrumented System, or part of thereof, made of “N” independent channels, which are so 
connected that “M” channels are sufficient to perform the safety instrumented function”. In 
(CCPS 2007) as “ “N” designated the total number of devices (or channels) implemented; 
“M” designates the minimum number of devices (or channels) out of N required to initiate, 
take, or maintain the safe state.” Thus, it requires a minimum of M units to vote for the 
execution of the safety function, see Figure 9 (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 
2012).  
The SISs are usually implemented using simple parallel and MooN majority voting 
architectures (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). The systems with MooN voting redundancies 
are a special case of K-out-of-N systems. The failure criterion of a MooN system is the 
failure of N-M+1 components, where 𝑀 ≤ 𝑁 and M out of N components are necessary to 
begin an action (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 2011).  
 
2.2 Safety requirement Specification 
In petroleum industry, there are used numerous safety systems that aim to detect the onset 
of hazardous events and to mitigate the serious consequences of accidents/incidents. SISs 
are often implemented to reduce the risk to an acceptable level (i.e. an acceptable risk level 
is a criterion), which is often represented as safety requirement specification set by 
authorities, company requirements or by the stakeholders during risk analysis (Eliassen 
2013). Safety requirement specifications (SRS) are specifications that describe the required 
safety function that must be performed by a SIS.  
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The safety requirements can be divided into two main categories. First, the functional safety 
requirements, which are the safety requirements related to the intended purpose of the 
facility or equipment (e.g. to ensure the facility or equipment maintain a safe state).  
In other words, the specification of safety functions makes explicit the requirements needed 
to prevent risk of incident throughout all operational modes of the facility or equipment. 
Second one is the safety integrity requirements that are related to the failure-free 
performance of a safety system, thus  the safety integrity level (SIL) can be expressed 
quantitatively as an average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) representing the 
mechanisms of failures and incidents occurrence for safety systems, in Table 1. 
 
Likely, failure mechanisms are present in all control systems to varying degrees, thus the 
safety measures needed to overcome control system failures include (a) the selection of high 
reliability components, (b) the development of a fault tolerance architecture for the entire 
system, from sensors through to actuators, and (c) a fault avoidance approach to the design 
process (HSE 2003). 
 
2.3 Standards IEC61508 and IEC61511 
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) introduced the standards, IEC 61508, 
and IEC 61511. In oil and gas industry, the IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC 61511 (2003) 
standards are widely used during all phases of the SIS lifecycle. Both standards use SIL as 
measure of SIS reliability and provide the framework for quantification of SIL, as well as 
define the four safety integrity levels, from SIL1 to SIL4. They also describe the desired 
safety and reliability performance that covers (1) the functional safety requirements, stating 
the tasks SIS required to do and (2) the safety integrity requirements, stating the performance 
Table 1: Requirements for SIL, defined by IEC61508 & IEC61511 Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
   
 
24 
 
of the SIS (Lundteigen 2008). Therefore, the role of international standards is key of 
importance for hazardous facilities requiring certain safety measures. In general, the 
international standards, (IEC 61508 1998) & (IEC 61511 2003) provide a unified approach 
to safe and reliable SIS design, implementation, and operation and maintenance, considering 
the challenges and opportunities of using technology and work processes, and procedures 
(Lundteigen 2008).  
 
2.3.1 Standard IEC 61508  
The IEC 61508 (1998) standard, “Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable 
Electronic Safety-related Systems” is a basic functional safety standard that is applicable for 
suppliers of microprocessor-based instrumentation to all kinds of industry. It defines 
functional safety as “a part of overall safety relating to the equipment under control (EUC) 
and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-
related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction 
facilities.” The (IEC 61508 1998) standard presents the ALARP principle. This principle 
requires that any risk should be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP) considering the technical and economic aspects. Therefore, a safety measure 
should only be introduced if the benefits of employing the safety measure prove to be greater 
than the cost of the risk reduction measure. It requires every safety function must achieve a 
specific SIL, which will be determined in advance based on a previous risk assessment (A. 
C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). Later, a new IEC 61508 (2010)  standard is developed as a 
performance-oriented standard, thus it specifies the design and operation of SIS to achieve 
the necessary risk reduction. Thereby, it does also introduce the safety integrity levels (SIL) 
as the overall performance measure, which can translate the necessary risk reduction into 
technical requirements and process requirements concerning design, operation, and 
maintenance (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016). The standard IEC 61508 (2010) organizes its 
requirements according to a safety life cycle that comprises 16 phases. 
2.3.2 Standard IEC 61511 
The IEC 61511 (2003) standard “Functional Safety- Safety Instrumented Systems for the 
Process Industry Sector” is a sector standard for the end user (e.g., oil and gas facilities), 
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integrators, and the designers of the SISs, as well engineering companies detailing the 
requirements for design and implementation of SIS for the process industries. In general, the 
standard defines requirements that must be fulfilled in given devices or subsystems 
implemented in SIS. In other words, it is a technical standard, which sets out practices in the 
engineering design of systems in order to ensure the safety of an industrial process using 
SIS. The IEC 61511 (2003) standard is explicitly from the IEC 61508 (1998) standard; thus, 
it cannot be completely implemented without referring to the IEC 61508 standard. The IEC 
61511 standard also provides the design and management requirements for SISs throughout 
the entire safety life cycle.  
 
2.3.3 Safety Integrity 
Safety is “the expectation that a system does not, under defined conditions, lead to harm 
people, either directly or indirectly” (CCPS 2007). Safety integrity is defined in the standard 
IEC 61508 (1998) as “probability of a safety related system satisfactorily performing the 
required safety function under all the stated conditions within a stated period”. A safe state 
is generally achieved when a SIS performs its intended safety integrated functions (SIF). If 
the SIS fails to perform those SIFs, the hazardous event may result in an accident, thus each 
SIF implemented into a SIS is required to have a high reliability, which is expressed as a 
safety integrity level (Eliassen 2013). The SISs are normally operate in the low demand 
mode, which means that regular testing and inspection are required to reveal SIS failures 
(Lundteigen and Rausand 2007). Depending on how often the demand occurs SISs are 
classified as low-demand systems and high-demand systems in . The IEC 61508 (1998) 
standard defines the low-demand mode of operation as “where the frequency of demands 
for operation made on a safety- related system is not greater than one per year and no 
greater than twice the proof-test frequency”. Further, the operational demand modes of 
safety systems are different in function of two different dependability parameters such as 
probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) and probability of dangerous failure per hour 
(PFH).  
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Table 2: SIL requirements for dependability parameters, IEC61508 Source: [ (Catelani, Ciani and Luongo 2011)] 
 
In addition, the safety validation should be performed in terms of the overall safety function 
requirements and the overall safety integrity requirements, taking in to account the safety 
requirements allocation for safety system in designing. Moreover, the IEC 61508 and IEC 
61511 introduce a set of additional requirements to SIS design for achieving a sufficiently 
robust system architecture. These requirements are referred to as architectural constraints in 
(Lundteigen and Rausand 2009) and their intention is to have additional channels to ensure 
the activation of the SIF in case of failure occur in the SIS. The failure of safety instrumented 
systems (i.e. not performing its intended safety functions) results in loss of the assets, 
damages to the environment, harm to personnel on the facilities, and even in worst scenario 
loss of life (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009).   
 
2.4 Reliability Theory 
2.4.1 Reliability 
In general, reliability presents the ability of an item or system to perform its intended 
function. The study of reliability includes many different aspects. The reliability theory is 
derived mainly from probability theory. A definition of reliability is given in (A. C. Torres-
Echeverria 2009) as “the probability of a component or system to perform its intended 
function during a specific period of time and under a given set of conditions.” Thus, 
reliability is measure of dependability. The term dependability is used as reference to 
attributes such as availability, reliability, and safety in (Laprie 1992). Thereby, a definition 
of dependability is given in (Rausand and Høyland 2004) as “a collective term to describe 
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the availability performance and its influencing factors”, and one more definition found in 
(Avizienis, Laprie and Randell 2000) as “dependability is the ability to deliver a service that 
can justifiably be trusted”. In (Rausand and Høyland 2004) mentioned that system reliability 
approach focuses on the reliability of systems composed of several components, based on 
the probability distribution function of the failure-times of those components.  
Study shows that there are many methods have been developed for analyzing the reliability 
of a system, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), 
reliability graph (RG), Markov Analysis (MA), and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS), and of 
course each method has its own advantages and disadvantages (Kim 2011). In case of safety 
systems, the standards IEC 61508 (1997) and IEC 61511 (2003) propose methods of safety 
quantification with the help of simplified equations based on RBD and FTA, and these two 
approaches work with static methods and mean values, thus they are simple and visual 
(Redutskiy 2017a). According to Dutuit et al. (2008), the FTA is too simple to handle for 
the practitioners and it provides approximations which sometimes bring non-conservative 
results, on the other hand, the use of switching MA is suitable to taking into account 
dependencies due to proof testing and common cause failure (CCF). The MA is a more 
complex approach that works with dynamic models and it provides more flexibility for 
incorporating many failure modes and analyzing their interactions (Redutskiy 2017a).  
 
2.4.2 Reliability importance  
In technical systems, the reliability importance of components is measured, because such 
importance measures provide information how the reliability of individual components 
influences the reliability or unreliability of the system. Thus, the component`s importance 
depends on the component`s reliability and location in the system structure (Liu and 
Lundteigen 2015). Regarding system components, RBD are suitable for systems of non-
repairable components, where the order in which failures occur does not matter. On the 
contrary, MA will be more applicable for the systems that are repairable and/or the order in 
which failures occur is important (Rausand and Høyland 2004). However, the reliability or 
unreliability of the safety systems is quantified by the average probability of failure on 
demand (PFDavg) (Liu and Lundteigen 2015). Referring to SIS, the reliability prediction 
plays a fundamental role because SISs include complex interactions of pneumatic, hydraulic, 
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electrical, and programmable electronic components. Thus, it is necessary to select a method 
that can capture the complexity and at the same time contribute with more insight to how 
the SIS works among SIS designers, operators, and maintenance personnel (Catelani, Ciani 
and Luongo 2010). 
 
2.4.3  Reliability and Failure Rate  
With reference to (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009), reliability is the probability of an item 
that performs its intended function for a specific period of time under specific conditions 
(i.e. is a probability of non-failure of system) as mathematically expressed as following:  
 
(1) 𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
 
 
In contrast, the probability of failure for a specific period of time under specific conditions 
is then as following: 
 
(2) 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑅(𝑡)     
                
Failure rate is the number of failures per unit time of identical items, and it is illustrated as 
a bathtub curve in Figure 10.  This curve explains that the failure rate is high and decreasing 
in the infant mortality phase that is because many of items can be weak with production fail 
or other faults. After that, the failure rate is constant practically in the useful time phase, as 
called constant failure rate, but during this time the components fail randomly caused by 
external loads. In the last phase, the components ages, thus, the failure rate increases.  
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Figure 10: A model “Bathtub curve” of failure rate   Source: [ (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009)] 
 
According to Goble (1998), the constant failure rate would be a conservative worst-case 
assumption that can be used, referring to (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009); the constant rate 
is a valid assumption for many devices, especially electronic devices. The failure rate can 
compute as follows (W. Goble 1998).  
 
(3) Λ (t)=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑅(𝑡)
 
 
Moreover, the constant failure rate leads to an exponential distribution with a cumulative 
distribution function, and the cumulative distribution function computes as follows (Lewis 
1996).  
(4) 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 
 
(5) 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 
 
 
Assumption: 𝜆𝑡 ≪ 0.1 this denotes that 𝜆𝑡 is very small. Thus, the probability of failure (i.e. 
unreliability) can be approximated by the rare event approximation as follows (A. C. Torres-
Echeverria 2009).  
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(6) 𝐹(𝑡) ≈ 𝜆𝑡 
 
2.4.4 System Reliability 
The total reliability of a system, which contains several of components, can be quantified 
considering the structure of each component. As mentioned before, there are several 
different structures for a system. Study shows that for SIS the basic system structures are 
series, parallel, M-out-of-N, and K-out-of-N, see Figure 12.  Thus, a parallel structure 
characterizes a system that functions if at least one of its components functions. The 
reliability of such system is as following (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009):  
 
(7) 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠 = 1 − (1 − 𝑅1) ∙ (1 − 𝑅2) ∙ … ∙ (1 − 𝑅𝑛) = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑅𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
Assumption: the term (1 − 𝑅𝑖) is equal to the unreliability of components, thus, if the 
value is given, it can be directly placed in the equation. 
If the system composed of only two components, it can be calculated as follows: 
 
(8) 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠 = 𝑅1 + 𝑅2 − (𝑅1 + 𝑅2) 
Furthermore, the K-out-of-N structure represents a system that functions if at least K out of 
the total N components function. This structure is often referred to SIS. And the M-out-of-
N structure is equivalent to a K-out-of-N. It assumed that all N components are identical, 
thus the reliability of such system can be quantified as following (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 
2009): 
 
(9) 𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠 = ∑ (
𝑛!
𝑖!(𝑛−𝑖)!
)𝑛𝑖=𝑘 𝑅
𝑖(1 − 𝑅)𝑛−𝑖 = ∑ (
𝑛
𝑖
) 𝑅𝑖(1 − 𝑅)𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑖=𝑘  
 
To conclude, the equations of system reliability are applicable to system availability 
quantification, because both terms are defined as probabilistic measures of system 
dependability (i.e. system trustworthiness). In order to enhance the reliability of SIS, there 
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are several choices either to improve the inherent reliability by introducing more reliable 
components, add more redundancy, or  carry out more often regular proof testing, which 
may be costly due to higher operational costs follow from the higher frequency of  
maintenance and production stops, according to (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016). 
 
2.4.5 Proof test and failure detection 
To verify that a SIS performs its safety functions and to reveal any failures, there are several 
tests have been defined such as diagnostic testing, function testing, and visual inspections 
(Lundteigen and Rausand 2007). These tests are classified generally by their solicitation 
mode as on-line or off-line, e.g. diagnostic tests are on-line tests that detect random failures 
of a component or a system, while proof tests are off-line, which are periodic inspection tests 
(Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015). More specific, the proof tests are performed to 
detect the hidden undetected failures of a system in operation. After detecting the hidden 
failures, the system can be restored in a condition “as good as new” or as close as practical 
to this condition (IEC 61508 2010). The proof tests are performed at regular intervals 
(Rahimi and Rausand 2013), and the test interval (𝑇𝑖) is considered equal to the time between 
two consecutive proof tests (J. Bukowski 2001).  According to Torres-Echeverria et.al 
(2009), several strategies that can be applied to the proof tests, and the author pointed out 
four main strategies as follows.  The first one is simultaneous test, which requires all 
components must be tested together, and then it needs a sufficient number of technicians to 
test all system components. During proof test, the SIS is unavailable. The second strategy is 
sequential test that tests all components consecutively one after the other. The third one is 
staggered test where all components are tested with their own period of time. The fourth one 
is random test, which means the time interval between two tests of components is randomly 
chosen.  Moreover, Innal et al. (2016) pointed out that the purpose of performing proof tests 
is to detect the hidden dangerous undetected failures, which are more critical than other 
failures. Regarding to system reliability, having more often proof tests can be a strategy to 
enhance the system reliability, but it may have some possible negative effects such as higher 
operational costs (i.e. more frequent planned maintenance and production stops cost more) 
and increased risk level due to more abruption of normal operation.  
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2.4.6 Failure modes  
The standard IEC 61508 proposed a failure mode classification, and it splits all failures into 
four categories according to failure causes.:  
a. Dangerous Undetected (DU)- failures that only revealed by a functional test 
(i.e. proof test) or upon a demand   
b.  Dangerous detected (DD)- failures that detected by automatic self -test or 
incidentally by personnel 
c.  Safe Undetected (SU)- failures that not detected by automatic self-test or 
incidentally by personnel and resulting in a spurious trip of component 
d.  Safe detected (SD)- failures that have a potential to spurious trip and revealed 
by automatic self-test or incidentally by personnel  
A definition of safe failure is given as a “failure that does not have the potential to put the 
safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state” (IEC 61508 2010). 
Additionally, a different definition of safe failures is given in the PDS method (a method 
presented and used in Norwegian O&G industry), as “failures with a potential to cause a 
spurious trip”, i.e. failures where the safety system is activated without a demand (Hauge, 
Lundteigen and Hokstad, et al. 2010).  According to the standards (IEC 61508 1998) and 
(IEC 61511 2003), the dangerous failures are failures that prevent the SIS from functioning 
on demand. Thereby, dangerous detected failures are failures that detected by diagnostic 
testing, which is performed by dedicated software and hardware that is usually implemented 
in the components or added to the SIS configuration (Lundteigen and Rausand 2007). During 
inspection and function testing, which are performed at regular intervals, discover dangerous 
undetected failures (IEC 61511 2003).  The interval between function tests effect directly 
on the safety instrumented function`s probability of failure on demand (Lundteigen and 
Rausand 2007).  Furthermore, based on the classification of failure modes, the failure rate λ 
can be defined as follows (IEC 61508 2010). 
 𝜆𝐷𝐷, Rate of dangerous detected failures 
 𝜆𝐷𝑈, Rate of dangerous undetected failures 
 𝜆𝑆𝐷, Rate of safe detected failures (spurious trip) 
 𝜆𝑆𝑈, Rate of safe undetected failures (spurious trip) 
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In addition, the PDS method presents a rate of critical failures noted as  𝜆𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡. This indicates 
the failures which unless detected can cause a failure on demand or a spurious trip of the 
safety function (Hauge, Lundteigen and Hokstad, et al. 2010), in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11:  Different elements of the failure rate of safety system    Source: [Hauge et al. (2010)] 
All failures considered, it is important realizing that all detected failures and undetected safe 
failures contribute to safe failure fraction (SFF) in 2.4.8. 
 
2.4.7 Diagnostic Coverage   
With reference to (IEC 61508 2010), the diagnostic coverage (DC) is “fractional decrease 
in the probability of dangerous hardware failures resulting from the operation of automatic 
diagnostic tests”. The standard introduces the term “safe diagnostic coverage”, to present 
the fractional decrease of safe random hardware failures. The term random hardware failures 
refer to failures resulting from the natural degradation mechanisms of the component 
(Hauge, Lundteigen and Hokstad, et al. 2010). According to   (Mechri, Simon and Ben 
Othman 2015), the failures of safety systems are divided into two main groups such as (1) 
safe failures-𝜆𝑆, and (2) dangerous failures- 𝜆𝐷. These two groups are divided further into 
four failure modes as detected failures {𝜆𝑆𝐷 , 𝜆𝐷𝐷} and undetected failures {𝜆𝑆𝑈, 𝜆𝐷𝑈} by 
using of the rate diagnostic coverage (DC). The diagnostic testing reveals the detected 
failures, while proof testing only reveals undetected failures. The standard IEC 61508 
defines the rate DC as the ratio between the failure rate of detected dangerous failures 
(𝜆𝐷𝐷) and the total failure rate of the dangerous failure rate (𝜆𝐷), referred in (Goble and 
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Brombacher 1999).  In (IEC 61508 2010) a formula is given to compute the DC rate as 
following: 
 
(10) 𝐷𝐶 = 
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷
=
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝐷+𝜆𝐷𝑈
   
 
(11)  𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶𝜆𝐷 , 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝐷  
 
 
Thereby, the rate DC measures the effectiveness of the diagnostic test, and considering the 
estimated DC; the total failure rate 𝜆𝑇 is as follows (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015): 
 
(12) 𝜆𝑇 = 𝐷𝐶𝜆𝐷 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝐷 + 𝐷𝐶𝜆𝑆 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝑆 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷 + 𝜆𝑆𝑈 
 
Here, to highlight that the dangerous failures split into two failure groups as dangerous 
detected (DD) failures- 𝜆𝐷𝐷 and dangerous undetected (DU) failures- 𝜆𝐷𝑈. Only the fraction 
of DD failures among all dangerous failures is referred to as the diagnostic coverage. Thus, 
the dangerous failures rate is as follows (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016):  
 
(13) 𝜆𝐷 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 𝐷𝐶𝜆𝐷 + (1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝐷 
 
In (CCPS 2007), another definition of DC introduced as: diagnostic coverage (𝜀) is the 
fraction of total failure rate that can be detected by the diagnostic mechanism, which refers 
to an in-built hardware or software mechanism in safety systems for automatic detection of 
internal failures. The DC expresses in percentage, and the following formulas can be used 
for calculating detected and undetected failure rates (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009): 
 
(14) 𝜆𝐷 = 𝜀 ∙ 𝜆𝑇  
 
(15) 𝜆𝑈 = (1 − 𝜀) ∙ 𝜆𝑇 
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2.4.8 Safe Failure Fraction 
The standard IEC 61508 introduces the safe failure fraction (SFF) in relation to the 
requirements for hardware fault tolerance. SFF is the ratio of safe failures and dangerous 
detected failures to the total failure rate, as expressed following (IEC 61508 1998):  
 
(16) 𝑆𝐹𝐹 = 1 − (
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆
) 
 
In the PDS method, SFF is the fraction of failures that are not critical with respect to safety 
unavailability of the safety function, and it can be expressed as follows (Hauge, Lundteigen 
and Hokstad, et al. 2010). 
 
(17) 𝑆𝐹𝐹 = 1 − (
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
) 
 
(18) 𝑆𝐹𝐹 = [1 − (
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝜆𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
)] ∙ 100% 
 
 
Another definition of SFF is presented in (Gabriel 2017), as “Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) 
is the fraction of the overall random hardware failure rate of a device resulting to a detected 
dangerous failure or a safe failure”. The author also proposed a method to calculate SFF. 
According to the standard IEC 61508 (2010), all components, especially those, which 
require allowing the subsystem to process safety function (e.g. electrical, electronic, 
electromechanical, etc.) should be considered carefully when assessing the SFF and 
diagnostic coverage of a safety system.  
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology used in the research of this thesis.  Research 
methodology refers to a discussion of the underlying reasoning why particular methods are 
used, and methods are the technical steps taken to do the research. Thus, this part describes 
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the formulation of the research question and a plan how to collect data and defining the 
methods that can be used for analyzing the data as well as the approaches used to solve the 
problem to answer the research questions.   
 
3.1 Research objective 
In theory, there are two main objectives of research such as (1) fact finding and (2) theory 
building. The theory building research makes predictions before evidence is gathered 
through data gathering, while fact-finding research uses data evidence to make theoretical 
predictions (Wacker 1998). This thesis is based on certain theoretical predictions used to 
select the methods of the research, its aim is to make theoretical predictions based on the 
analyzed data, and the result of computational models, thus the objective of this research fits 
the characteristics of both theory building and fact-finding.  
 
3.1.1 Research strategy  
In theory, the research strategies split into two parts such as (1) quantitative research, which 
concerns the quantification in the collection and analysis of data, and (2) qualitative 
research, which concerns more the descriptive detail and explanation of data. In addition, 
the relationship between theory and research is defined by two main approaches such as (1) 
deductive, where the researchers assumes one or more theoretical hypotheses and subjects 
them to empirical study, and ( 2) inductive, where the researchers build new theory based 
on their empirical findings and observations, into the certain theoretical domain, according 
to Bryman and Bell (2015).  This thesis uses both quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies as well as belonging to the deductive approach of the research. With a qualitative 
research, the purpose of research is to gain a better understanding of the requirement 
specifications for SIS and the nature of the problems related to the SIS design and 
maintenance planning for remotely located O&G facility. On the other hand, with a 
quantitative research selecting optimization methods to solve the problem, addressing the 
issues of various maintenance policies for establishing the staffing size and determining the 
crew schedules for the O&G facilities located in remote areas.  
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3.1.2 Research design 
A research design can be defined as a plan that helps the researcher in the process of 
collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations (Nachmias and Nachmias 1993). It is 
the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions 
and, ultimately, to its conclusions (Yin 2003). Thus, the purpose of a research design is to 
maximize valid answers to the research questions and describing how, when and where data 
will be collected and analyzed. A better way to understand the model is by making a case 
study research in order to achieve the real time results, according to Yin (2014). In theory, 
there are two main designs of case studies such as (1) single-case design and (2) multiple-
case design.  The single-case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single 
case, which can be a single organization, a single location, a single person, or a single event 
(Bryman and Bell 2015). On the contrary, a multiple-case study contains more than a single 
case, and the conduct of such a case requires extensive resources and time beyond the means 
of a single student (Yin 2003). To conclude, the research design of this thesis is a quantitative 
single-case study.  
 
3.1.3 Research method 
A research method is a technique for gathering the necessary data through available sources 
e.g., documentation, archival records, interviews, observations, or physical artifacts, 
according to Yin (2003). This thesis uses a combination of research techniques due to the 
choice of research strategies in 3.1.1. For better understanding of the problem set, it is 
essential to gather the necessary qualitative information about Safety system design in the 
petroleum industry and maintenance planning for the remotely located O&G facilities, 
thereby the focus is on the maintenance personnel (i.e., staffing size, personnel 
transportation, work scheduling), used search engines for scientific and academic research. 
There are many academic search engines available, but some engines, are the most relevant 
for this research and as well as the most trusted academic resources, that used widely by 
researchers and scholars. For the quantitative research, the data used in the research is taken 
from a project implemented by Rosneft in East Siberia in Russia. The chosen methodology 
for this study includes as following: 
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o Markov analysis of the safety system functioning, based on the standard 
Markov model for the safety system`s performance used in various works, 
like in Bukowski (2006). 
 
o Lifecycle modeling of the whole solution`s reliability and costs associated 
with the decisions throughout the entire timespan of facility operations, based 
on the widely accepted cost modelling used in various works, like in Torres-
Echeverria (2009), with the necessary modifications to reflect the approach 
to maintenance of the remotely located facilities.  
 
o Black-box optimization of the safety system design and maintenance 
planning, following the ideas of the various works on engineering design, 
e.g., Martorell et.al. (2004).  
 
3.2 Research problem and research questions 
One of the most important parts of research is to define the research questions. The 
development of the research questions requires patience and time, and they need to have 
both substance (i.e. what the study is about) and form (i.e. who, where, how, or why), 
according to Yin (2003). During the different stages of the research study and as moving 
through the literature review, it is possible to go back to the initial research questions and 
revise them or suggest new ones, pointed out in (Bryman and Bell 2015). The purpose of 
the research questions is to gain better understanding of the research problem statement and 
finding an optimal solution to it. The research questions below are the final research 
questions for this study, and they differ a bit from the research questions that initially 
outlined during the proposal paper.  
The overall problem statement for this master`s thesis is: 
Optimizing the problem of the safety system design, considering the set of safety 
measures inherent in SIS and the approach to the SIS maintenance through workforce 
scheduling for formulating straightforward requirements that could be a starting point 
for the detailed engineering design of SIS. 
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For this, the following research questions are made in understanding the stated problem and 
its solutions: 
 Research Question (RQ) [Part1]: Safety Systems 
RQ1.1: What are the recommendations to the requirement specifications for the design of 
safety systems? 
 Research Question (RQ) [Part2]. Maintenance 
RQ2.1: How important is maintenance of SIS to operations on the remotely located O&G 
facilities? 
RQ2.2: What are the required maintenance frequencies of SIS in the remotely located O&G 
facilities? 
RQ2.3: How to establish the staffing size and determine the crew schedules, considering the 
transportation to and from the remotely located O&G facilities? 
 Research Question (RQ) [Part3]. Solutions 
RQ3.1: What can be done to improve the safety of operations on the O&G facilities that 
located in poorly accessible regions? 
RQ3.2: What can be the future research for this topic that can provide better solutions? 
 
3.3 Problem analysis and data collection 
The research mainly includes quantitative methods and algorithms with a goal to address the 
problem of SIS design and maintenance modelling to optimize the set of safety measures in 
the SIS and simultaneously determines the number of maintenance personnel and their 
working schedules. Thus, the modelling in this research is to ensure the safety of operations 
by simultaneously evaluating the decisions on the safety system`s components and 
structures, the facility maintenance frequencies, the staffing size of maintenance personnel 
and transportation of staff, as well as the schedules of their work shift. Thereby, the details 
of the SIS functioning and maintenance are merged into a Markov model used for safety 
quantification. Besides, a black-box optimization algorithm used for the decision-making 
process. In addition, the objective function defined in this research is to address the 
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economic perspective on the lifecycle of the technological solution. In other words, the 
purpose of the cost-minimization objective is to explore a trade-off between the capital 
investments into the complexity of the safety system as well as the operational expenditures 
associated with the system maintenance and the expected losses in case of the incidence of 
hazardous events.  Altogether, this research will contribute to the area of engineering design 
by addressing the issues of SIS design and their maintenance for the remotely located 
process facilities. Overall, the purpose of the research is to answer the research questions 
and find a solution to the main problem statement. For this purpose, it requires to collect the 
necessary data for the computational experiment. The data adopts from a real project 
implemented by a Russian company (Rosneft). Another point worth noting is this study is 
based on the research by Redutskiy (2017a). The objectives and models for this research on 
the one hand is case specific. On the other hand, the solution methods and models that are 
used in this research can be transferable to other process industries, considering the safety 
system problems.  
 
3.4 Research area 
3.4.1  Spurious trip 
Referring to 2.4.6, dangerous failures lead to hazardous consequences, while safe failures 
result in spurious activation without causing any hazards. For the complex SIS, it is difficult 
to reveal all hardware failures perfectly either by diagnostic test or proof tests. Theoretically, 
the dangerous undetected failures must be revealed by means of proof tests rather than safe 
ones. Then the safe failures remain undetected and cannot be eliminated, but they exist in 
the system through the entire system lifecycle. This results in spurious trip of SIS at any 
time. Once the spurious trip of SIS revealed, it must be repaired. The time used for the repair 
is called the mean repair time (MRT), according to the standard IEC 61508 (2010). The PDS 
method defines the spurious trip as “a spurious activation of a single SIS element or of a SIF 
(Sintef 2006).  
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3.4.2 Common Cause Failure 
Common Cause Failure (CCF) is a great treat to SIS reliability, which may lead to 
simultaneous failures of redundant components and safety barriers (Lundteigen and Rausand 
2007).  In addition, redundancy is often introduced to improve the reliability of SISs, but 
CCF may violate the intended reliability gain (Rahimi and Rausand 2013). Despite of 
substantial amount of research, there is no an accepted common definition of CCF. The 
authors regarding their application area usually interpret the term. Referring to SIS, there is 
a definition of CCF given in the standard IEC61511 (2003), as a “CFF is a failure which is 
the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or more separate channels in a 
channel system, leading to a system failure.” A channel is a single redundant path within a 
SIF, and it also can be a single SIF in case more than one SIF is required to obtain the 
necessary risk reduction (Lundteigen and Rausand 2007). In other words, a CCF is a result 
of an event that affects simultaneously several or all components of a redundant system, 
resulting in loss of the required function, i.e. SIS fails to function when a demand occurs 
(Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016). Therefore, the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 require 
that the effect of CCF must be considered in reliability calculations, and the standard 
IEC61508 recommends for SIS using the beta-factor model, where β is the conditional 
probability of a CCF when a failure has occurred (Rausand and Høyland 2004).  According 
to the beta-factor model, the total failure rate of a component 𝜆𝑇is the sum of independent 
failures (𝜆𝐼) and CCFs (𝜆𝐶), which can be expressed as following (Mechri, Simon and Ben 
Othman 2015): 
 
(1) 𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝐼 + 𝜆𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇 
 
Where β is the failure probability due to a common cause given the occurrence of a failure 
(Lundteigen and Rausand 2007). As described in (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016) β 
represents the ratio of CCFs (𝜆𝐶), thus, the expression of β is given as following (Mechri, 
Simon and Ben Othman 2015): 
 
(2) 𝛽 =  
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝐶+𝜆𝐼
=
𝜆𝐶
𝜆𝑇
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Further, applying this β equation into the total failure rate equation, thus the detected and 
undetected failure modes are divided into the independent failures and common cause 
failures. Thereby, the final CCF quantification expresses as following (Mechri, Simon and 
Ben Othman 2015):  
 
(3) 𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼 + 𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐶 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷
𝐼 + 𝜆𝑆𝐷
𝐶 + 𝜆𝑆𝑈
𝐼 + 𝜆𝑆𝑈
𝐶  
 
Considering only the dangerous failure of the components, the various rates of the detected 
and undetected dangerous failures express as follows (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 
2015): 
 
(4) 
{
 
 
 
 𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 = (1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝐷𝐶𝜆𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝐷
𝐶 = 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷 = 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐶𝜆𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽𝑈)𝜆𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝛽𝑈)(1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝐷
𝜆𝐷𝑈
𝐶 = 𝛽𝑈𝜆𝐷𝑈 = 𝛽𝑈(1 − 𝐷𝐶)𝜆𝐷
 
 
Here, the factors 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛽𝑈 respectively represent the proportion of detected and undetected 
CCFs related to the DC rate (Langeron, et al. 2008).  This is because safe failures do not 
have any effect on the ability of the SIS to perform its functions, while dangerous failures 
may prevent the SIS from performing on demand (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015). 
The frequency and quality of maintenance may lead to CCF and therefore affect the beta-
factor, e.g., a SIS element with low inherent reliability will fail rather often and will require 
frequent maintenance, which may cause CCFs (Rahimi and Rausand 2013). With reference 
to (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009), the Common Cause Failure (CCF) is an important factor. 
The author proposes the following formulas to calculate the CCF and the independent 
failures, noted as “normal”.  
 
(5) 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆𝑇 
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(6) 𝜆𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 = (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜆𝑇 
 
Moreover, an extended version of this beta -factor model is developed and called as the PDS 
method that is often used in the Norwegian oil and gas industry (Sintef 2006). The PDS 
method is used to quantify unavailability and loss of production for SISs, and it accounts all 
types of failure categories, e.g. technical, software, human, etc. (Hauge, Lundteigen and 
Hokstad, et al. 2010). In general, the oil and gas industry are directing on CCF in the design 
phase of the SIS (Lundteigen and Rausand 2007).   
 
3.4.3 Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) 
The probability of failure on demand (PFD) is “a value that indicates the probability of a 
system failing to respond to a demand”. The average probability of a system failing to 
respond to a demand in a specified time interval is noted as PFDavg. Then, the PFD equals 
to 1 minus Safety Availability (i.e. safety unavailability). The Safety Availability is “fraction 
of time that a safety system is able to perform its designated safety service when the process 
is operating” (ISA 1997).  
The Average Probability of Dangerous Failure on Demand (PFDavg) is a probabilistic 
measure to SIL based on how often the SIS is required to respond to hazardous events (IEC 
61508 2010).  In other words, the PFDavg is the safety unavailability of the system that 
affects its ability to react to hazards (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015) & (Torres-
Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 2012). This measure applies when the SIS needs to 
respond on the average every year or less and usually used for low-demand mode.  
The standard IEC61508 (1998) recommends analytical formulas for the PFDavg that are 
tailor-made for selected configurations. And the quantification of the PDF value considers 
several parameters such as system configuration and architecture, failure rates, proof test 
intervals, repair and restoration times, and common cause failures. The PFDavg calculation 
is based on random hardware failures (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015), as expressed 
by a constant failure rate λ, and not all failures are equally important and relevant for the 
quantification (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016).   
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As mentioned in (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015), (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and 
Thompson 2012), (Dutuit, et al. 2008), and (Goble and Brombacher 1999), the PFDavg 
calculation must be obtained by quantitative methods, and this calculation must be 
connected with the computation of the safety function unavailability on demand. The SIS 
performance qualification, i.e. PFDavg is usually obtained by reference to the standard 
IEC61508 (1998), a target range of PFDavg is allocated to each of the four SILs. It is 
necessary to evaluate how the reliability of system can be improved if the calculated PFDavg 
is above the target range of specified SIL requirements (Innal, Lundteigen, et al. 2016).  
 
3.4.4 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a method that illustrates simple structures and is used 
for system reliability quantification, and moreover, it represents the logical relationship 
between the components for successful functioning of the system, e.g. each square block 
represents one component (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009). According to Rausand and 
Høyland (2004), a reliability block diagram is a success-oriented network describing the 
function of the system, i.e., it shows the logical connections of components needed to fulfill 
a specified system function. If the system has more than one function, each function must 
be considered individually, and a separate reliability block diagram must be established for 
each system function. For instance, Figure 12 illustrates the three basic system structures 
with three components as RBDs.  
 
Figure 12: Basic system structures, RBDs    Source: [ (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 2009)] 
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In the work (Catelani, Ciani and Luongo 2010), the RBD methodology is proposed and 
applied to SIS designed for Steam turbine, oil and gas application, computing the PFDavg in 
order to clarify the safety aspects for both operators and technicians. And, the authors 
concluded that RBD models are intuitive and easy to create i.e. RBD shows system 
decomposition in blocks easy to study, and thus it can help the technicians especially in case 
of complex systems.  
 
3.4.5 Markov Method 
Markov Analyses (MA) is one of modeling approaches that mentioned in IEC 61511 (2003), 
as a holistic approach often used in dependability studies when one wants to model a 
repairable system with components at constant failure and restoration rates (Liu and Rausand 
2011).  According to Mechri, et.al. (2013), Markov models are probably the most relevant 
model to consider the different events such as failure, proof test, failure rate, common cause 
failure. Markov model is well suitable if the SIS is periodically tested and in low-demand 
mode.  Markov model is used to compute SIS performance whatever is the demand mode 
(Jin, Lundteigen and Rausand 2011). However, the main advantage of Markov model is to 
be more accurate and flexible according to the specific feature of each mode (Chen 2011).  
For instance, the Markov model applied in (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015) to 
calculate the performance of safety systems (PFDavg) that operating in low-demand mode 
to integrate the proof tests. The proof tests are carried out for at regular intervals to reveal 
hidden failures (Rahimi and Rausand 2013). Further, the Markov chains are interesting 
formal models that requires identifying the different states (Liu and Rausand 2011) where a 
SIS and its characteristic parameters can take, e.g., it is possible to model different failure 
modes of the components, test strategies, repair operation, diagnostic coverage and CCF. 
However, the explosion of the state numbers strictly limits this method due to that the 
modeling process involves the enumeration of all accessible states and all transitions 
between these states (Mechri, Simon and Ben Othman 2015).  
Moreover, Markov chains models are usually used for some dynamic effects associated with 
tests and maintenances. This approach is applied in (Redutskiy 2017a) for modeling the 
performance of SIS to account for device failures occurrence and repairs, the occurrence of 
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technological incidents, and execution of facility maintenance work over the lifecycle of a 
hazardous facility.  
 
3.4.6 Asset Management 
3.4.6.1 Maintenance for safety systems 
Maintenance is an action that combines all technical and administrative considerations in 
order to retain a system or to restore it to a state in which the system can perform its required 
functions (Dekker 1996). With this, the maintenance process takes in preventive and 
corrective actions carried out to maintain a system to its operating condition (Nguyen, Do 
and Grall 2015). Thereby, the objectives of maintenance are multiple as for ensuring the 
system function (i.e. availability, efficiency, and product quality), and ensuring the system 
life (i.e. asset management) and ensuring the safety of the system as well as safeguarding 
human life (Dekker 1996). The availability of a complex system often is strongly associated 
with the components reliability and maintenance policy, and the maintenance policy has 
influences both on the components repair time and reliability affecting the system 
degradation and availability (Frangopoulos and Dimopoulos 2004). Thus, optimal 
maintenance policies proposed to provide optimal system reliability, availability, and safety 
performance at the lowest possible maintenance cost (Nguyen, Do and Grall 2015).  
According to Eti, et.al. (2007), maintenance can gain much from improving the work 
processes involved in maintenance functions by integrating the maintenance requirements 
into the planning and decision-making stages. More precisely, if there is a wise consideration 
of reliability, availability, maintainability, and supportability (RAMS) and risk in 
maintenance planning, policy decision making to the maintenance requirements of safety 
system, then the frequency of failures and their consequences can be reduced significantly, 
and considerable savings can be made in the operation processes.  
However, to improve the reliability of the system, the reliability improvement measure is 
used to identify the importance ranking of components relating to the improvement ability 
on the system reliability. This importance measure does not consider the maintenance cost 
(Rausand and Høyland 2004). Therefore, an extension of this importance measure as “cost-
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based group improvement factor” for group-based maintenance decision-making proposed 
by (Nguyen, Do and Grall 2015) .  
In addition, reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is a method that can be applied to define 
maintenance policy in order to assurance the system operational performance, mentioned by 
Modarres (1993) and Kahn and Haddara (2004). The RCM provides a standard, common 
methodology for assessing, ranking, and evaluating the effectiveness of any maintenance 
procedure, and it also brings structure and order into the strategy, which provides a resource 
map that identifies the roles played by the various working groups (Eti, Ogaji and Probert 
2007). According to (Dekker 1996), RCM is a more qualitative approach to maintenance, 
and it directs maintenance efforts at those parts and units where reliability is critical. The 
maintenance optimization models are the quantitative approach. 
 
3.4.6.2 Maintenance optimization models  
Maintenance optimization is a method to determine the most effective and efficient 
maintenance plan, considering inspection time and frequency, work preparation, required 
maintenance resources. The best possible balance can be achieved between direct 
maintenance costs, e.g., labor cost, transportation costs, and the consequences of not 
performing maintenance as loss of production and assets (Shafiee and Sørensen 2017). In 
(Dekker 1996), the author defined maintenance optimization models as mathematical 
models that is used to find the optimum balance between the costs and benefits of 
maintenance, while taking all kinds of constraint into consideration. Mostly, maintenance 
benefits consist of savings on costs i.e. less failure costs.  
In (Nguyen, Do and Grall 2015) mentioned that there are mainly two types of maintenance 
technique such as (1) time-based maintenance (TBM) and (2) condition-based maintenance 
(CBM). The TBM is about preventive maintenance decision based on the system age and all 
information on the system lifetime (Dekker, Wildeman and van der Duyn Schouten 1997), 
while CBM is a maintenance decision making process, which relies on diagnostic of the 
system condition over time (Bouvard, et al. 2011). For instance, Tian et al., (2012) developed 
a multi-objective CBM approach to deal with the multi-objective CBM optimization 
problem considering system cost and reliability. This optimization approach thoroughly 
explores the tradeoff between the optimization objectives, and it provides an optimal 
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solution that responds to the decision maker`s preference (Alaswad and Xiang 2017). In 
CBM optimization, there are multiple and conflicting design objectives that can be as 
minimizing the maintenance costs, maximizing the reliability, minimizing equipment 
downtime, etc. (Tian, Lin and Wu 2012).  
Furthermore, there is a bi-objective optimal inspection and maintenance planning approach 
proposed by (Barone and Frangopol 2013) for structural systems with a purpose to minimize 
both system failure rate and expected total cost, and further the authors considered several 
multi-objective optimization problems for determining maintenance schedules for 
deteriorating structures. And for each optimization problem the minimizing total cost is 
considered as first objective, and as second objective might be as following, e.g. system 
reliability, availability, risk, and hazard function. Moreover, an overview on time-based and 
condition-based maintenance in industrial applications with the most recent condition 
monitoring techniques, are presented in (Ahmad and Kamaruddin 2012). In fact, safety 
systems have many redundancies and components with great number of combination and 
alignment alternatives among them. Therefore, it needs other approaches that can deal with 
such complexities. 
 
3.4.6.3 Workforce Scheduling and Routing Problem (WSRP) 
Regarding the oil and gas facilities remotely located, one of the arisen problems is workforce 
scheduling, crews need to be carried out the maintenance at locations far from the coast or 
the central location, hence requiring some form of transportation. With reference to 
(Castillo-Salazar, Landa-Silva and Qu 2016),  the workforce scheduling and routing problem 
(WSRP) considers any environment where it does need a skilled workforce should be 
scheduled to performing a set of activities distributed over geographically different locations 
and the activities must be performed within a given time window, assuming the time window 
for each activity is usually determined by the recipient of the job.  
It can be studied as a part of the vehicle routing problem with time windows (VRPTW), 
which has the main objective to minimizing the total travel distance (Desrochers, Desrosiers 
and Solomon 1992). This can be associated with the performing maintenance to several 
installations spread across many locations and each installation specifies a time window (i.e. 
time for performing a task at a operators premises) when the maintenance takes place. 
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Another point regarding to VRPTW is “a depot”. This can be the location where the staff 
are sent out and come back (i.e. same starting and ending location).  
Besides this, an extended version of VRPTW is introduced in the work of (Brandao and 
Mercer 1998) and called as vehicle routing problems with multi-trips, and they address the 
fact that a worker could perform more than one trip on a day to visit the location. A trip is 
referred to a series of tasks before going back to the depot (Castillo-Salazar, Landa-Silva 
and Qu 2016). In addition, regarding time window, an interesting problem “manpower 
allocation” presented in (Lim, Rodrigues and Song 2004). They address to assigning workers 
to a set of customer locations to perform the service activities with the objectives to 
minimizing the number of servicemen used, the total travel distance, the service time, 
including the waiting time at service points, and simultaneously maximizing the number of 
tasks assigned. This is relevant to WSRP, especially in this study.  Thus, in addition, the 
transportation must be considered, and assumed that all workforces use the same type of 
transport considering the cost efficiency.  
 
3.4.7 Optimization Theory 
3.4.7.1 Genetic Algorithm (GA) approach 
The genetic algorithms (GA) are considered as an evolutionary computation techniques that 
are very useful for solving complex problems with high dimensional, discrete, non-linear 
and discontinuous. It has a capacity to handle integer variables (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell 
and Thompson 2012). In this paper (Gen and Yun 2006) the genetic algorithms applied to 
find  the set of Pareto-optimal solutions for multi-objective supply chain network (SCN) 
design problem, which means the problem has multiple and conflicting objectives such as 
cost, service level, resource utilization, etc.  
Moreover, GA are able to deal with problems which objective function is not explicit, and 
it works with an initial population of potential solutions called individuals. Each individual 
is a potential solution to the optimization problem: a coded representation of one set of 
decision variables in the decision space. These individuals are evaluated, selected and mated 
to create new and better ones, which are fed into a new generation, making an iterative 
process that mimics the natural evolution, thereby each step of the GA is executed by the 
   
 
50 
 
application of genetic operators (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 2012) in 
Figure 13. 
 
   
  Figure 13: A general structure of GA    Source: [ (Innal, Dutuit and Chebila 2015) 
Regarding to optimization of SIS design, a comprehensive overview of work related to 
MooN optimization using GA is presented in (Torres-Echeverria, Martorell and Thompson 
2012), and the authors developed a very interesting SIS optimization procedure that 
considers many aspects such as PFDavg, STR, SIS reconfiguration during proof-tests, 
different tests strategies and life cycle costs. According to the studies in the field of SIS in 
many articles, GA have been developed and coded in MATLAB software to solving 
different optimization problems. Genetic Algorithms are an evolutionary computation 
technique, which provide the decision maker a pool of good optimal solutions (A. C. Torres-
Echeverria 2009). 
 
3.4.7.2 Multi-objective optimization 
In this research, the focus is multi-objective optimization, which is an essential part of 
optimization theory.  Multi-objective formulations are realistic models for complex 
engineering optimization problems. Considering the real-life situations, it might be 
necessary to formulate the optimization problem with more than one objective function 
simultaneously (Jahromi and Feizabadi 2017). More often, a single objective with several 
constraints may not adequately represent the problem and can result in unacceptable results 
regarding the other objectives (Konak, Coit and Smith 2006).  
Thus, a multi-objective optimization is a simultaneous minimization of the different 
objectives (Innal, Dutuit and Chebila 2015).  Nevertheless, it is impossible to obtain a perfect 
multi-objective solution that simultaneously optimizes each of objective function. Thereby, 
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a reasonable solution to a multi-objective problem is to investigate a set of solutions, each 
of which satisfies the objectives at an acceptable level without being dominated by any other 
solution (Konak, Coit and Smith 2006).   
By using a multi-objective genetic algorithm allows to identify a set of Pareto optimal 
solutions in one single run (Deb, et al. 2000), providing the decision maker with the complete 
spectrum of optimal solutions with respect to the various objectives, thus the decision maker 
can select the best compromise among these objectives (Giuggioli Busacca, Marsequerra 
and Zio 2001). More specific, if a solution is not dominated by any other solution in the 
solution space, it is a Pareto optimal (i.e. non-dominated) solution. Thereby, the set of all 
feasible non-dominated solutions in the decision space is the Pareto optimal set, thus the 
corresponding objective function values in the objective space are the Pareto front (Innal, 
Dutuit and Chebila 2015).  
In the modeling of multi-objective problem, the user is need to use optimization toolbox of 
MATLAB to choose the right solver (e.g. gamultiobj-Multiobjective optimization using 
genetic algorithm) and call the function to handle related the objective function, which can 
contain several objectives ( e.g. 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔
𝑆𝐼𝑆 , 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑆, 𝐶𝑝
𝑆𝐼𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑇
𝑆𝐼𝑆), referring to the work of  
(Innal, Dutuit and Chebila 2015).  
 
3.4.7.3 Black box optimization 
Research shows that the black box optimization is a useful tool for solving the complex 
maintenance-optimization problems. In the recent years, the black-box complexity theory 
produced several very fast black-box optimization algorithms, according to Doerr et al. 
(2015), and these black-box algorithms often profit from solutions inferior to the previous 
best. Black-box complexity is counting the number of queries needed to find the optimum 
of a problem without having access to an explicit problem description (Doerr, Kotzing, et 
al. 2013), and it was presented to measure the difficulty of solving an optimization problem 
through generic search heuristics (Droste, Jansen and Wegener 2006).  
In fact, the choice of how to model the optimization problem has a significant influence on 
its black-box complexity, revealed by Doerr et al. (2013). However, Limbourg and Kochs 
(2006) mentioned that black box optimizations are problem solving heuristics, which are 
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“intelligently guess” new solutions based on older experiences and some general 
assumptions. It is often used for optimization of maintenance decisions at componential 
level because black box optimization model does not consider the relationships between 
components (Shafiee and Sørensen 2017).  
Considering important design problems, there is a need to make some decisions by finding 
the global optimum of a multi-extremal objective function subject to a set of constraints. 
Especially in engineering applications, the functions involved in optimization process are 
black-box with unknown analytical representations and hard to evaluate. This type of 
problems often cannot be solved by traditional optimization techniques, according to Kvasov 
and Sergeyev (2015), and the authors developed some powerful deterministic approaches to 
construct numerical methods for solving practical black-box optimization problems.  
 
4.0 Models for Safety system design and maintenance 
An important part of this research is to develop mathematical model for solving the SIS 
design and maintenance optimization problems. This section presents the mathematical 
structure and description of the models that are constructed for this study.  
4.1 General Model: SIS design and maintenance planning 
This section is based on (Redutskiy 2017a). The generalized model in this paper is used as 
a base model contained in this study. 
4.2 Modelling assumptions 
In the case of oil and gas facilities, one of the most important aspects may be maintenance 
of the safety systems to ensure a smooth operation, in relation to the economic perspective 
of the plant. The functions of the safety systems are aimed at reducing the risk of dangerous 
events. In some cases, the automatic instrumentation systems may fail due to technical errors 
that may result in the shutdown of the entire process. To prevent such situations from 
occurring, maintenance is required either continuously or periodically. At the processing 
facility, crews of technicians must stay in shift to monitor the operation and perform the 
necessary maintenance due to the given maintenance policy. In the case of remote locations, 
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the crews will travel to and from the facility, for that reason they must have a work schedule 
that includes both daily work and rest time in addition to the travel frequency. 
In addition, the following assumptions are considered for this modelling: 
 Only random hardware failures are considered 
 Regarding the failure classification presented in 2.4.6, a spurious trip causes 
shutdown in the technology and all safe failures are detected  
 Technology is shut down for a repair in case a detected failure (DD or ST) occurs 
 The occurrence of failures, incidents, repairs of devices, and technology restorations 
will be modelled as exponentially distributed with constant failure rate 
 Proof tests are considered, i.e. periodic maintenance: As a result, all unseen failed 
devices are restored 
The common terms used for the different failures are given in Table 3. 
         Table 3: Notations for failure classification   Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
Notation Description 
Failure modes (used in superscript) 
DF 
DD 
DU 
RF 
ST 
Dangerous Failure 
Dangerous Detected Failure 
Dangerous Undetected Failure 
Random Hardware Failure 
Spurious Trip 
Notations for the general reliability categories 
𝝀 
𝒑 
failure rate 
probability of failure 
 
4.3 Problem setting 
The decision variables of the problem of SIS design and maintenance planning optimization 
includes the following:  
 Device models of transmitters, logic solvers, and final control elements from the 
databases of alternatives 
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 Redundancy architectures for each subsystem, considering MooN architectures 
where N is the total number of identical devices in the subsystem, and M is the 
number of devices needed to be in the operating condition so that the subsystem’s 
intended function could be performed 
 Additional electric separation of devices within each subsystem to ensure that all the 
subsystems do not fail at the same time with a common cause 
 Proof tests, i.e. the periodic maintenance frequency, with test interval (TI) between 
two consecutive overhauls 
 Maintenance policy, a decision for performing the maintenance either sequential or 
parallel  
 Staff size, i.e. the number of workers required to work at any point in time to conduct 
either the continuous maintenance or a periodic overhaul (i.e. proof tests) 
 Workforce schedule, a predefined working schedule including start date, work 
duration, etc. for the crews 
 
 The following objectives are measured in this modelling: 
 Average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) represents the mechanisms of 
failures and incidents occurrence 
 Mean downtime of the technological facility (DT) presents the expected value of the 
technological facility being in the shutdown state, more specific instrumentation 
failures and spurious trips contribute to the downtime, and so do the technological 
incidents 
 Lifecycle cost of the ESD system installed at a processing facility 
 
4.4 Mathematical formulation 
The generalized mathematical formulation of the SIS design and maintenance planning 
problem is presented in this section.  
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4.4.1 Lifecycle modelling 
This modelling is continuing the general model presented in 4.1, with a focus on workforce 
scheduling for shift work to conduct the maintenance at the remotely located oil and gas 
processing facility. The lifecycle cost is evaluated, and personnel levels are estimated by 
Markov model. In addition, the workforce scheduling is modelled as a set-covering problem 
considering the company’s reward system for the shift durations and working hours.  
First, the notations used for the modelling of the SIS design and maintenance planning 
optimization problem, followed by the formulations of objective functions, variables, and 
constraints below. 
Table 4: Notations for the SIS design and LC modelling 
Notation Description 
𝒒 
 
index of subsystems of the SIS 
𝑞 = 1 corresponds to sensors 
𝑞 = 2 corresponds to logic solver 
𝑞 = 3 corresponds to final control elements  
𝒍 index of device models 
𝒓 index of redundancy 
𝒘 index of weeks in the technological solution’s operations timespan 
𝒔 index of possible trips for works travelling to the facility 
𝒄 index of daily shift work alternatives 
𝑺𝒒
𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 set of device model alternatives for instrumentation subsystem 𝑞 
𝑺𝒒
𝒓𝒆𝒅 set of redundancy alternatives for instrumentation 
𝑺𝑻𝑹𝑰𝑷 set of all possible trips, considering all trip durations, and starting times 
𝑺𝑫𝑺 set of all daily shifts: daily work and rest schedule for each worker for trips 
 Decision variables 
𝒙𝒍𝒒
𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒕 binary decision variable: equals 1, if device model 𝑙 is chosen for subsystem 𝑞; 0, otherwise 
𝒙𝒓𝒒
𝒓𝒆𝒅 binary decision variable: equals 1, if redundancy option 𝑟 is chosen for subsystem 𝑞; 0, 
otherwise 
𝒙𝒒
𝒔𝒆𝒑
 binary decision variable: equals 1, if additional electrical/physical separation is introduced 
for subsystem 𝑞; 0, otherwise 
𝒙𝒔
𝑾𝑭𝑻 integer variable: # of crews taking the 𝑠𝑡ℎ  trip to a facility (for each 𝑠𝑡ℎ trip, the duration of 
the trip and the starting time is specified 
𝒙𝒔𝒄
𝑾𝑭𝑺 binary variable: equals 1, if workers taking the 𝑠𝑡ℎ trip are to work under the 𝑐𝑡ℎ daily 
schedule 
𝒙𝒘
𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅
 integer variable:  the required # of workers at the facility during week 𝑤 
𝑻𝑰 integer variable: time between two consecutive proof tests, [weeks] 
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𝒙𝒒
𝑴𝑷 binary variable: maintenance policy for the 𝑞𝑡ℎ subsystem 
 Parameters and Functions 
𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 average probability of failure on demand 
𝑫𝑻 facility downtime 
𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 lifecycle cost of the solution 
𝑺𝑰𝑳 safety integrity level determined for a particular SIS configuration, as demonstrated in  
Table 1 (SIL defined in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511) 
𝑺𝑰𝑳𝑹𝑬𝑸 the necessary target SIL prescribed by governmental regulations on safety 
𝝈𝒘𝒔 binary parameter indicating whether week 𝑤 is covered by the trip option 𝑠 or not 
 
The objective functions: 
 
 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑋
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑋𝑊𝐹 , 𝑋𝑀𝑃, 𝑇𝐼) 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑇(𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑋𝑊𝐹 , 𝑋𝑀𝑃, 𝑇𝐼), 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒(𝑋
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑋𝑊𝐹 , 𝑋𝑀𝑃, 𝑇𝐼). 
(4.1) 
  
Decision variables: 
 
 
         𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 = {𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡},  𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑 = {𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑},   𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝 = {𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝}, 
                      𝑋𝑊𝐹 = {𝑥𝑠
𝑊𝐹𝑇 , 𝑥𝑠𝑐
𝑊𝐹𝑆} 
(4.2) 
 
Constraints for the requirements: 
 
                    𝑆𝐼𝐿(𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 , 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑋𝑊𝐹 , 𝑋𝑀𝑃, 𝑇𝐼) = 𝑆𝐼𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑄, (4.3) 
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Constraints for subsystem:  
 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡  
𝑙∈𝑆𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡
= 1, ∀𝑞, (4.4) 
 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑  
𝑟∈𝑆𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑
= 1, ∀𝑞, (4.5) 
 
Constraints for workforce scheduling:  
 
 ∑ 𝜎𝑤𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑊𝐹𝑇
𝑠∈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑃
≥ 𝑥𝑤
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑, ∀𝑤, (4.6) 
 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑐
𝑊𝐹𝑆 
𝑐∈𝑆𝐷𝑆
= 1, ∀𝑠. (4.7) 
 
In oil and gas industry, regarding the standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, the designed 
technological solutions are expected to maintain the safety integrity level, especially for a 
hazardous process the run on the facility. Thus, this is expressed in the constraint (4.3). The 
constraints (4.4) and (4.5) restrict that only one option for the selection of device model and 
a redundancy architecture for a subsystem.  
The constraint (4.6) expresses that the number of workers required to be available at the 
facility at any time (w) to perform the maintenance, should be covered by a sufficient 
number of crews taking certain (𝑠𝑡ℎ)trips. The last constraint (4.7) ensures that only one 
daily shift schedule should be chosen for every trip taken by a crew (either 8 hours shift or 
12 hours shift, given in Table 12 ).  
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4.4.2 Markov Model: Modelling a subsystem 
In addition, the dangerous and safe failures of components of any subsystem are modeled 
for the time interval TI (i.e. test interval) that referred to a period between two consecutive 
proof tests: [0, TI]. And the failures in a subsystem with MooN architectures include (N-
M+2) states described by Markov model, as illustrated in the following Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14: Markov process of failures and repairs    Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
Furthermore, state is the operating state for all N components, while state 2 and all further 
states represent failure of one component each. Thus, the entire subsystem fails to perform 
when (N-M+1) components fail which corresponds to the end state on the graph. Occurrence 
of independent failures and repairs is depicted by consecutive transitions between the states, 
e.g. 𝜆1,2 presents the failure, while 𝜆2,1 is corresponding repair. Additionally, the common 
cause failure (CCF) occurrence is depicted by direct transitions from any state to the end 
state. 
Assumption: the occurrence of device failures, incidents and repairs is stochastic and 
modelled in the framework of reliability theory. Thus, the exponential distribution for the 
probability of failure occurrence, which corresponds to constant failure rate, is demonstrated 
by the following formula (Redutskiy 2017a): 
 
 𝑝(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆∙𝑡 (4.8) 
 
The mathematical formulation of the modelling a subsystem is divided into three sections 
regarding the different modes of failure (i.e. outputs).  
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Table 5: Notations used in the modelling a subsystem     
Notations Description 
 Indices, parameters, and functions 
𝒊, 𝒋 indices of Markov model states 
𝑻𝑰 test interval, the time period between proof tests, [h] 
𝑵 total number of components in MooN architecture 
𝒑𝒋
𝑫𝑼(𝒕) the probability of (𝑗 − 1) dangerous undetected failures in a subsystem 
𝒑𝒋
𝑫𝑫(𝒕) the probability of (𝑗 − 1) dangerous detected failures in a subsystem 
𝒑𝒋
𝑺𝑻(𝒕) the probability of (𝑗 − 1) spurious trips in a subsystem 
𝒕 time, [h] 
𝑴 the necessary number of operating devices in MooN redundancy scheme 
𝝀𝒊,𝒋
𝑫𝑼 transition rate (from state 𝑖 to state  𝑗)  
𝝀𝒊,𝒋
𝑫𝑫 transition rates for the model of dangerous detected failure occurrence 
𝝀𝒊,𝒋
𝑺𝑻 transition rates for the model of spurious trips 
𝜷 common cause failure factor, a fraction 
𝝀 the dangerous failure rate for one component, [ℎ−1] 
𝜺 diagnostic coverage, a fraction 
𝝁 repair rate for one component, [ℎ−1] 
 Output of the model 
𝝀𝑫𝑼 the dangerous undetected failure rate for the subsystem 
𝝀𝑫𝑫 the dangerous detected failure rate for the subsystem 
𝝀𝑺𝑻 spurious tripping rate for the subsystems 
4.4.2.1 Markov model of dangerous undetected failures in a subsystem: 
 
 
    (
𝑑𝑝𝑗
𝐷𝑈
𝑑𝑡
) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝑈(𝑡)𝑁−𝑀+2𝑖=1 ∙ 𝜆𝑖,𝑗
𝐷𝑈,      𝑗 ∈ {1, … , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.9) 
 𝜆𝑖,𝑖
𝐷𝑈 = −𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝜀) ∙ [(𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽], 
𝜆𝑖,𝑖+1
𝐷𝑈 = (𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ (1 − 𝜀) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜆, 
𝜆𝑖,(𝑁−𝑀+2)
𝐷𝑈 = (1 − 𝜀) ∙ 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆, 
𝑖 ∈ {1,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
(4.10) 
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 𝑝1
𝐷𝑈(0) = 1,             𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝑈(0) = 0, 
𝑖 ∈ {2,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.11) 
 
𝝀𝑫𝑼 = −
𝐥𝐨 𝐠(𝟏−𝒑𝑵−𝑴+𝟐
𝑫𝑼 (𝑻𝑰))
𝑻𝑰
. 
 
(4.12) 
 
4.4.2.2 Markov model of dangerous detected failures in a subsystem: 
 
 
   (
𝑑𝑝𝑗
𝐷𝐷
𝑑𝑡
) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝐷(𝑡)𝑁−𝑀+2𝑖=1 ∙ 𝜆𝑖,𝑗
𝐷𝐷,     𝑗 ∈ {1, … , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
𝜆1,1
𝐷𝐷 = −𝜀 ∙ 𝜆 ∙ [𝑁 ∙ (1 − 𝛽) − 𝛽], 
𝜆1,2
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑁 ∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝜆 ∙ (1 − 𝛽), 
𝜆1,𝑁−𝑀+2
𝐷𝐷 = 𝜀 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆, 
𝜆𝑖,(𝑖−1)
𝐷𝐷 = (𝑖 − 1) ∙ 𝜇, 
 
(4.13) 
 𝜆𝑖,𝑖
𝐷𝐷 = −𝜀 ∙ 𝜆 ∙ [(𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽] − (𝑖 − 1) ∙ 𝜇, 
𝜆𝑖,𝑖+1
𝐷𝐷 = (𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ 𝜀 ∙ (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜆, 
𝜆𝑖,(𝑁−𝑀+2)
𝐷𝐷 = 𝜀 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆, 
𝑖 ∈ {2,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.14) 
 𝑝1
𝐷𝐷(0) = 1,             𝑝𝑖
𝐷𝐷(0) = 0, 
𝑖 ∈ {2,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.15) 
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𝝀𝑫𝑫 = −
𝐥𝐨 𝐠(𝟏−𝒑𝑵−𝑴+𝟐
𝑫𝑫 (𝑻𝑰))
𝑻𝑰
. 
(4.16) 
 
4.4.2.3 Markov model of spurious trips in a subsystem: 
 
 
   (
𝑑𝑝𝑗
𝑆𝑇
𝑑𝑡
) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑆𝑇(𝑡)𝑁−𝑀+2𝑖=1 ∙ 𝜆𝑖,𝑗
𝑆𝑇 ,         𝑗 ∈ {1, … , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
𝜆1,1
𝑆𝑇 = −𝜆𝑆 ∙ [𝑁 ∙ (1 − 𝛽) − 𝛽], 
𝜆1,2
𝑆𝑇 = 𝑁 ∙ (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜆𝑆, 
𝜆1,𝑁−𝑀+2
𝑆𝑇 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆𝑆, 
𝜆𝑖,(𝑖−1)
𝑆𝑇 = (𝑖 − 1) ∙ 𝜇, 
 
(4.17) 
 𝜆𝑖,𝑖
𝑆𝑇 = −𝜆𝑆 ∙ [(𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽] − (𝑖 − 1) ∙ 𝜇, 
𝜆𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑆𝑇 = (𝑁 − 𝑗 + 1) ∙ (1 − 𝛽) ∙ 𝜆𝑆, 
𝜆𝑖,(𝑁−𝑀+2)
𝑆𝑇 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝜆𝑆, 
𝑖 ∈ {2,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.18) 
 𝑝1
𝑆𝑇(0) = 1,             𝑝𝑖
𝑆𝑇(0) = 0, 
𝑖 ∈ {2,… , (𝑁 −𝑀 + 2)}, 
 
(4.19) 
 
𝝀𝑺𝑻 = −
𝐥𝐨 𝐠(𝟏−𝒑𝑵−𝑴+𝟐
𝑺𝑻 (𝑻𝑰))
𝑻𝑰
. 
(4.20) 
 
With reference to (Redutskiy 2017a), the mathematical formulations presented in (4.9), 
(4.13), and (4.17) are for describing for any failure mode, the probability of the subsystem 
being in a particular Markov state, known as Kolmogorow forward equations. Further, the 
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equations (4.10), (4.14), and (4.18) express the non-zero (failure) transition rates for the 
three failure modes, and all the rest transition rates equal to zeroes. The starting point of the 
stochastic process is state 1, which corresponds to the initial distribution of probabilities in 
the formulations (4.11), (4.15), and (4.19). The probabilities of the stochastic process being 
in state the last state, (N-M+2) in Figure 14 , is the probability of the dangerous undetected, 
dangerous detected, and spurious trips failures for the modelled subsystem, thus, given the 
exponential distribution of failures, the corresponding failure rates can be obtained in the 
equations (4.12), (4.16), and (4.20).  
 
4.4.3 Markov model for the lifecycle of ESD system 
Modelling the lifecycle of ESD system from the safety perspective and as well as the 
economic perspective is described in this section. The following assumptions are made for 
the life cycle modeling: 
 the subsystem is performing its intended function, 
 the subsystem is under overhaul due to a DD failure, 
 the subsystem is under overhaul due to a ST, 
 the technology is running on the facility, 
 the technology is in the DU failure mode, 
 the technological incident has occurred.  
The incidents, failures, and repairs are modelled during the entire lifecycle of the ESD 
system. The time horizon for lifecycle modelling is illustrated in the following Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15: Time horizon for lifecycle modelling   Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
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Reference to (Redutskiy 2017a), the occurrence of failures in the three subsystems (PVT, 
LS, and FCE) and technological incidents (TECH) is displayed in Table 6, and the transition 
between the 12 states are illustrated in Figure 16.  
 
Table 6: Markov model for the lifecycle of ESD system     Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
STATE PVT LS FCE TECH EXPLANATIONS 
1 
2 
up 
up 
up 
up 
up 
up 
up 
down 
Normal course of the process 
Safety function performed 
3 
4 
5 
O/S 
up 
up 
up 
O/S 
up 
up 
up 
O/S 
down 
down 
down 
 
Overhaul after a ST 
6 
7 
8 
O/D 
up 
up 
up 
O/D 
up 
up 
up 
O/D 
down 
down 
down 
 
Overhaul after a DD failure 
9 
10 
11 
failure 
up 
up 
up 
failure 
up 
up 
up 
failure 
up 
up 
up 
 
Undetected failure has occurred 
12      
 
              
Figure 16: Markov process for the LC of ESD system    Source: [ (Redutskiy 2017a)] 
 
ESD is shut down, The incident has occurred: failure on demand 
state 
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Mathematical formulations of Markov model for the life cycle of ESD system, 
considering the safety perspective:  
 
Table 7: Notations for LC modelling from the safety perspective     
Notations Description 
 Indices, parameters, and functions 
𝒊, 𝒋 indices of states for Markov model 
𝒒 index of ESD subsystems 
𝑵 total number of components in MooN architecture 
𝒌 index of time periods between the proof tests 
𝒑𝒋(𝒕) the probability of the process being in the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ state 
𝝀𝒊,𝒋 transition rate from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗, [ℎ
−1] 
𝒕 time, [h] 
𝑳𝑪𝒉 duration of the lifecycle, [h] 
𝒓 incidents occurrence rate, [ℎ−1] 
𝝁𝒕 restoration rate for the technology, [ℎ−1] 
𝝁 repair rate for one component, [ℎ−1] 
𝝀𝒒
𝑫𝑼 DU failure rate for the 𝑞𝑡ℎ  subsystem, [ℎ−1] 
𝝀𝒒
𝑫𝑫 DD failure rate for the 𝑞𝑡ℎsubsystem, [ℎ−1] 
𝝀𝒒
𝑺𝑻 ST rate for the 𝑞𝑡ℎ subsystem, [ℎ−1] 
𝝅𝒋
𝒌 initial condition for the 𝑘𝑡ℎtime period 
𝑻𝑹 repair time necessary for conducting proof tests, [h] 
𝑻𝑺𝑼 start-up time after the shutdown necessary for maintenance  
𝑲 the lifecycle periods 
 Output of the model 
𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 average probability of failure on demand 
𝐷𝑻 mean down time of the process, hours 
 
The lifecycle of ESD system is divided in to K periods, which is expressed in the following 
formulation:  
 
𝐾 = ⌈
𝐿𝐶ℎ
𝑇𝐼
⌉, 
(4.21) 
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The modelling time horizon during each 𝑘-th time period: 
 
 𝑡 ∈ [0; 𝑇𝐼] ∪ [𝑇𝐼 + 𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑆𝑈; 2 ∙ 𝑇𝐼]
∪ [2 ∙ 𝑇𝐼 + 𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑆𝑈; 3 ∙ 𝑇𝐼] ∪ …
∪ [(𝐾 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼 + 𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑆𝑈; 𝐾 ∙ 𝑇𝐼], 
(4.22) 
 
The probabilities of the Markov process being in each state: 
 𝑑𝑝𝑗(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=∑𝑝𝑗(𝑡) ∙ 𝜆𝑖,𝑗 ,
12
𝑖=1
         𝑗 ∈ {1, … ,12} 
(4.23) 
 
The non-zero transition rates and the remaining rates in the current state, Figure 16: 
 
 
𝜆1,1 = −(∑𝜆𝑞
𝐷𝑈
𝑞
+∑𝜆𝑞
𝐷𝐷
𝑞
+∑𝜆𝑞
𝑆𝑇
𝑞
) 
 
(4.24) 
 𝜆1,2 = 𝑟,  
 𝜆1,3 = 𝜆1
𝑆𝑇 ,  𝜆1,4 = 𝜆2
𝑆𝑇 ,  𝜆1,5 = 𝜆3
𝑆𝑇 ,   
 
 𝜆1,6 = 𝜆1
𝐷𝐷 ,  𝜆1,7 = 𝜆2
𝐷𝐷,  𝜆1,8 = 𝜆3
𝐷𝐷 ,    
 𝜆1,9 = 𝜆1
𝐷𝑈,  𝜆1,10 = 𝜆2
𝐷𝑈, 𝜆1,11 = 𝜆3
𝐷𝑈, 
𝜆2,1 = 𝜇
𝑡, 𝜆2,2 = −𝜇
𝑡,  
𝜆3,1 = 𝜇,  𝜆3,3 = −𝜇, 𝜆4,1 = 𝜇, 𝜆4,4 = −𝜇, 𝜆5,1 = 𝜇,  𝜆5,5 = −𝜇, 
 𝜆6,1 = 𝜇,  𝜆6,6 = −𝜇,  𝜆7,1 = 𝜇, 𝜆7,7 = −𝜇, 𝜆8,1 = 𝜇,   𝜆8,8 = −𝜇, 
𝜆9,4 = 𝜆2
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆9,5 = 𝜆3
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆9,7 = 𝜆2
𝐷𝐷 , 𝜆9,8 = 𝜆3
𝐷𝐷,  
𝜆9,9 = −(𝜆2
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆3
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆2
𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆3
𝐷𝐷 + 𝑟), 
𝜆9,12 = 𝑟,  𝜆10,3 = 𝜆1
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆10,5 = 𝜆3
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆10,6 = 𝜆1
𝐷𝐷 , 𝜆10,8 = 𝜆3
𝐷𝐷, 
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𝜆10,10 = −(𝜆1
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆3
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆1
𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆3
𝐷𝐷 + 𝑟), 
𝜆10,12 = 𝑟,  𝜆11,3 = 𝜆1
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆11,4 = 𝜆2
𝑆𝑇 , 𝜆11,6 = 𝜆1
𝐷𝐷, 𝜆11,7 = 𝜆2
𝐷𝐷 , 
𝜆11,11 = −(𝜆1
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆2
𝑆𝑇 + 𝜆1
𝐷𝐷 + 𝜆2
𝐷𝐷 + 𝑟),   𝜆11,12 = 𝑟, 
 
 
The lifecycle of the system begins, and the process is in the state 1, 𝑘 = 1: 
 
 𝜋1
1 = 1,      𝜋2
1 = 0,…𝜋12
1 = 0,    (4.25) 
 
The process continues in the periods 𝑘 = 2,3, … , 𝐾, : 
Assumption: periodically conducted proof tests are considered perfect, i.e. all previously 
undetected failures become resolved. The probabilities of being in states 2-8 are monotonic 
over the entire lifecycle of the system, and the remaining probabilities fail to be well behaved 
at the points of time when proof tests are conducted. 
 
 𝜋1
𝑘 = 𝑝1((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼) + 𝑝9((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼) + 𝑝10((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼)
+ 𝑝11((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼) + 𝑝12((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼),   
(4.26) 
 𝜋𝑗
𝑘 = 𝑝𝑗((𝑘 − 1) ∙ 𝑇𝐼), 𝑗 ∈ {2,… ,8},    
 𝜋𝑗
𝑘 = 0,    𝑗 ∈   {2, … , 𝐾},  
 
The repair time is calculated given the choices of sequential of parallel proof testing policy 
for each subsystem. The checks and repairs for every subsystem start simultaneously (when 
the proof tests begin). Knowing the repair time for one device in each subsystem and the 
maintenance policy for the subsystem, the total repair time that the subsystem requires may 
be calculated. Finally, we need to choose the subsystem that is being under repair the longest, 
to obtain the overall proof test duration: 
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 𝑇𝑅 = max{𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃 ∙ 𝑇𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑞 + (1 − 𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃) ∙ 𝑇𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟, ∀𝑞}   (4.27) 
 
The purpose of this modelling (4.23)-(4.26) is to obtain the values of  𝑝1(𝑡)… . 𝑝12(𝑡) , the 
probability of failures of 12 states, over the entire lifecycle of the system. These values are 
used to evaluate further the safety indicators such as the average probability of failure on 
demand (PFDavg), which is the main value of  𝑝12(𝑡), and the facility downtime (DT) of the 
process, obtaining from the probability of the Markov process being in states 2-8. For these 
indicators the following formulations are used for obtaining the values:  
 
 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔 =
1
𝐿𝐶ℎ
∙ ∫ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑡)
𝐿𝐶ℎ
0
𝑑𝑡 =
1
𝑇𝐼
∙ ∫ 𝑝12(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝐼
0
+
                    +∑
1
(𝑇𝐼−𝑇𝑆𝑈)
∙ ∫ 𝑝12(𝑡)𝑑𝑡,
𝑘∙𝑇𝐼
(𝑘−1)∙𝑇𝐼+𝑇𝑆𝑈
𝐾
𝑘=2    
(4.28) 
 
 𝐷𝑇 = ∑ [∫ 𝑝𝑗(𝑡)
𝑇𝐼
0
𝑑𝑡 + ∑ ∫ 𝑝𝑗(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑘∙𝑇𝐼
(𝑘−1)∙𝑇𝐼+𝑇𝑆𝑈
𝐾
𝑘=2 ] .
8
𝑗=2    
(4.29) 
 
4.4.4 Modelling for the staffing size requirements 
In this modelling, the purpose is to define the number of workers that required during each 
week of operations regarding the maintenances such as (1) continuous and (2) periodic.  
The following assumptions are made for this modelling. 
 For the continuous maintenance, the total repair time for all subsystems of 𝑁𝑞 
elements should be as maximum 8 work- hours.  
In addition, the repair times for the devices in subsystems are given in Table 14. The 
subsystems are illustrated in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: A control loop of "Line heater" 
 A certain number of workers, 𝑥𝑤
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑
 defined in Table 4, is required during the 
week of proof tests at the facility. Defining this variable will be depended on the 
decision made by the maintenance policy for the subsystems, which is defined as a 
binary variable 𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃 in Table 4. Thereby, the variable for maintenance policy is 
considered as follows.  
- If  𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃 = 0, sequential proof testing police,  
- If 𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃 = 1, parallel proof testing police. 
 
The number of workers for performing the proof tests for the subsystems:  
 
                                   𝒙𝒘
𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅
= ∑ [𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃 ∙ 𝑁𝑞 + (1 − 𝑥𝑞
𝑀𝑃)]𝑞    (4.30) 
 
𝑤 ∈ {
𝑇𝐼
7 ∙ 24
; 
2 ∙ 𝑇𝐼
7 ∙ 24
;… ; 
𝑘 ∙ 𝑇𝐼
7 ∙ 24
} 
 (4.31) 
 
The number of workers for performing the continuous overhauls for the subsystems: 
 
             
                      𝒙𝒘
𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅
=
𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡
8
,    ∀𝑤 ∖ {
𝑇𝐼
7∙24
;  
2∙𝑇𝐼
7∙24
; … ; 
𝑘∙𝑇𝐼
7∙24
}  
 
 
(4.32) 
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 𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 = (𝑁1 −𝑀1) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑇𝑆 + (𝑁2 −𝑀2) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐹𝐷 + (𝑁3 −𝑀3) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑃𝐿𝑆
+ (𝑁4 −𝑀4) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑆𝑉1 + (𝑁5 −𝑀5) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑆𝑉2 + (𝑁6 −𝑀6) ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑆𝑉3 
 (4.33) 
 
The equation (4.33) is for computing the effort in person-hours (PH) to repair all the 
subsystems, 𝑞 = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and total number of components  𝑁𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = {𝑁1 + 𝑁2 + 𝑁3 +
𝑁4 + 𝑁5 +𝑁6} , see Figure 17, for performing the continuous maintenance. 
  
4.4.5 Markov model for the life cycle cost of ESD system 
In this modelling, the total cost contains of three main components regarding the aspects 
such as procurement, operation, and costs associated with risk. 
 
Table 8: Notations for LC modelling from economic perspective    
Notations Description 
𝒒 index of ESD subsystems 
𝝉 time, [𝑦] 
𝑳𝑪𝒚 lifecycle, [𝑦] 
𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 lifecycle cost [currency units (CU)] 
𝑪𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄 procurement cost [CU] 
𝑪𝝉
𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓
 the yearly operation cost [CU] 
𝑪𝝉
𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌 the yearly risk cost [CU] 
𝑪𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 the design cost [CU] 
𝑪𝒍𝒒
𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉
 the cost of purchasing one device chosen for subsystem 𝑞 [CU] 
𝑪𝒍𝒒
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔 yearly electricity consumption by one device in subsystem 𝑞 [CU] 
𝑪𝒍𝒒
𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 the cost of conducting one proof test for one component of subsystem 𝑞 [CU] 
𝑪𝑷𝑳 hourly losses of production [CU/h] 
𝑪𝒍𝒒
𝒓𝒆𝒑
 the cost of repairing one component of subsystem 𝑞 [CU] 
𝑪𝒒
𝑺𝑷 the cost of spare parts replenishment for subsystem 𝑞 [CU] 
𝑪𝑭𝑴 the yearly cost of facility maintenance [CU] 
𝑪𝒊𝒏𝒄 the cost of an incident and hazardous consequences [CU] 
𝑪𝒔
𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒑
 the costs associated with trip s (related to the transportation and the trip’s duration) [CU] 
𝜸𝒄
𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕
 the cost modifier associated with the daily shift schedule 
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𝜸𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉 purchase cost modifier corresponding to the chosen circuitry configuration 
𝜸𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 design cost modifier corresponding to the chosen circuitry configuration 
𝜸𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔 consumption cost modifier corresponding to the chosen circuitry configuration 
𝝈 spare part cost fraction 
𝑻𝑺𝑼 start-up time after the shutdown necessary for maintenance before the facility can be 
restarted, [h] 
𝑫𝑫𝑹𝒚 dangerous detected failure rate for the given ESD, [𝑦
−1] 
𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒚 spurious tripping rate for the given ESD, [𝑦
−1] 
𝛿 discount factor for the cost model 
 
The present value of lifecycle cost of the ESD system: 
  
 
𝑪𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆 = 𝑪
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄 +∑(𝑪𝝉
𝒐𝒑𝒆𝒓
𝑳𝑪𝒚
𝝉=𝟏
+ 𝑪𝝉
𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌) ∙
𝟏
(𝟏 + 𝜹)𝝉−𝟏
 
(4.34) 
 
The procurement cost:   
 
 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐 = 𝐶𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ∙ 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙𝑟∈𝑆𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
                    𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑  
(4.35) 
 
The operation cost:  
 
 𝐶𝜏
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙  𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑 +𝑟∈𝑆𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
                  
365∗24
𝑇𝐼
∙ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑 +𝑟∈𝑆𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
                  
365∗24
𝑇𝐼
∙ 𝐶𝑃𝐿 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑈 + (𝐶𝑃𝐿 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑈 + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑝 ∙𝑟∈𝑆𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
                     𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑 + ∑ 𝐶𝑞
𝑆𝑃)𝑞 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑦 + 𝐶
𝑊𝐹 + 𝐶𝐹𝑀  
(4.36) 
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The cost of spare parts replenishment for each subsystem: 
 
 𝐶𝑞
𝑆𝑃 = 𝜎 ∙∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙  𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑟∈𝑆𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
 
(4.37) 
 
The dangerous detected failure rate for the ESD system: 
 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑦 = 365 ∙ 24 ∙
log (1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗(𝐿𝐶ℎ)|𝑋
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑇𝐼)8𝑗=6
𝐿𝐶ℎ
 
(4.38) 
 
 
In addition, the following equations introduced in order to show the impact of introducing 
electrical separation on the solution cost by choosing corresponding values of the cost 
modifiers for each subsystem: 
  
 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = 𝛾1
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
∙ 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝛾2
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
∙ (1 − 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝) (4.39) 
 𝛾𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ = 𝛾1
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝛾2
𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ ∙ (1 − 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝)      ∀𝑞  
 𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝛾1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝 + 𝛾2
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∙ (1 − 𝑥𝑞
𝑠𝑒𝑝) 
 
 
The cost associated with the workforce transportation to the facility and their daily shift 
schedule: 
 
 𝐶𝑊𝐹 = ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑠
𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑠
𝑊𝐹𝑇 ∙ 𝛾𝑐
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑥𝑠𝑐
𝑊𝐹𝑆
𝑐∈𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑠∈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑃
 
(4.40) 
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The risk cost: 
 
 𝐶𝜏
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = (𝐶𝑃𝐿 ∙ 𝑇𝑆𝑈 + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑙𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑝 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑞
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑞 ∙ 𝑥𝑟𝑞
𝑟𝑒𝑑) ∙𝑟∈𝑆𝑞𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑙∈𝑆𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑞
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑦 + 𝐶
𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔  
(4.41) 
 
The spurious tripping rate of the process: 
 
 
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑦 = 365 ∙ 24 ∙
log (1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗(𝐿𝐶ℎ)|𝑋
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡, 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑋𝑠𝑒𝑝, 𝑇𝐼)5𝑗=3
𝐿𝐶ℎ
 
 
(4.42) 
 
In addition, the dangerous detected failure rate 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑦 in (4.38), is obtained from states 6-8, 
and the spurious tripping rate 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑦 in (4.42), is obtained from the states 3-5, of the lifecycle 
Markov model.  
 
4.5 Multi-objective optimization 
The model in Redutskiy (2017a) is formulated as a multi-objective problem, a literature 
review in section 3.4.7.2. The author used a Markov model for modelling the SIS 
performance, more specific it is to account for device failures occurrence and repairs, the 
occurrence of technological incidents and execution of facility maintenance work over the 
lifecycle of a hazardous facility.  
In order to make the presented SIS design optimization problem compliant the author used 
a black box optimization algorithm. Further, to run the model there is a mathematical and 
programming capabilities of Mathworks Matlab software employed. Thereby, Markov 
analysis of system safety and the life cycle cost evaluation were implemented in the form of 
MATLAB script functions.  
The inputs of the functions are the design variables representing a SIS design and the time 
interval for the planned maintenance.  
   
 
73 
 
The outputs of programmed functions provide the values of the PFDavg, DT, and Lifecycle 
cost.   
Altogether, the scripts represent the objectives for the multi-criteria optimization problem. 
Further, MATLAB’s optimization toolbox provides gamultobj solver that implements the 
multi-objective controlled elitist genetic algorithm.  
 
 
Figure 18: Modelling and multi-objective optimization framework 
Modelling and multi-objective optimization framework: Life cycle evaluation of an SIS solution for a certain technology 
as a programmed function. Black-box optimization of the instrumentation specification together with the approach to 
maintenance and workforce planning. Source: own elaborations based on (Redutskiy 2017a) and (A. C. Torres-Echeverria 
2009)  
 
5.0 Solution 
This section presents the computational experiment and data used to solve the stated multi-
objective problem in order to obtain some results for the research problem.  
 
5.1 Computational experiment 
The generalized model presented in 4.4.1 cannot be solved with any classical integer 
optimization method due to its complexity. Thus, Markov model computations are applied 
for computing such complex model.  
The modelling has been programmed in MATLAB in the form of script functions.  
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The genetic algorithm (i.e. a black-box optimization algorithm run by  solver in 
Matlab’s optimization toolbox, illustrated in Figure 18) is applied to solve the SIS design 
and maintenance planning problem for the various options of the periodic overhauls 
frequency.  
The Markov model for the lifecycle considers the structure of technology in Figure 17, the 
Line heater consists of six subsystems linked in series, and as well as the descriptions in 
Table 6. The lifecycle model has 21 states (due to six subsystems, Figure 17 in 4.4.4), and 
the occurrence of an incident is illustrated in Table 9.  The optimization model has 655 
binary variables and 53 integer variables for design decision.  
 
Table 9: Failure on demand: Markov model for the LC of ESD system 
# TS FD PLC SV1 SV2 SV3 TECH EXPLANATIONS 
1 up up up up up up up Normal course of the process 
2 up up up up up up down Safety function performed 
3 ST up up up up up down  
4 up ST up up up up down Overhaul after a ST 
5 up up ST up up up down  
6 up up up ST up up down  
7 up up up up ST up down  
8 up up up up up ST down  
9 DD up up up up up down  
10 up DD up up up up down  
11 up up DD up up up down Overhaul after a DD failure 
12 up up up DD up up down  
13 up up up up DD up down  
14 up up up up up DD down  
15 DU up up up up up up  
16 up DU up up up up up Undetected failures occur 
17 up up DU up up up up  
18 up up up DU up up up  
19 up up up up DU up up  
20 up up up up up DU up  
21 down down down down down down down The incident has occurred. 
 
For the multi-objective genetic algorithm, the following settings are applied: 
 Population size: 200 
 Selection function: tournament 
 Generational gap: 80% 
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 Crossover and mutation functions: custom functions for integer values of decision 
variables 
 Initial population created with the uniform distribution applying a customized 
population creating function adapted for integer variables. 
The optimization problem is solved with the target SIL constraint in (4.3) for the purpose of 
minimizing the objective functions in (4.1), i.e. the average probability of failure on 
demand , facility downtime, and lifecycle cost, as well as with the logical constraints in 
(4.4), (4.5) and set-covering workforce scheduling constraint in (4.7). As a result, there are 
eight solutions obtained, presented in the following subsection 6.0.  
 
5.2 Case data   
For the chosen methodology in this study, the Russian company, Rosneft, gives all data, a 
case of a technological unit “Line heater” at the oil and gas processing facility. The data are 
used in the previous master thesis project, as in (Golyzhnikova 2016). This technological 
unit is aimed to heat gases or liquids prior to separation and pressure reduction in a safe 
manner. As mentioned earlier, an occurrence of dangerous actions of the oil and gas 
processing facility may result in interrupting the process, harming the facility and personnel, 
damaging the environment and as well as economic losses. For this reason, the critical 
actions that may quickly lead to incidents were identified. The critical process parameters 
and shutdown actions are given in the following Table 10 and Table 11 respectively. 
 
Table 10: Critical process parameters 
# Parameter Event Frequency, [𝑦−1] 
1 Temperature of the air Threshold HH = 850 °𝐶 0.03 
2 Flame detected on main burner No flame detected 0.08 
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Table 11: Shutdown actions 
# Final control element Action 
1 Open SV for discharging the fuel gas to flare open 
2 Close SVs on the input and output lines close 
 
Further, the data regarding the alternatives of shift work and trips are given in the following 
Table 12. The alternatives of shift work are given by the choices of a crew can work either 
8-hour (the shift consists of three workers) or 12-hour (the shift consists of two workers).  
After that, the crew will work at the facility for a duration of one, two, four, or six weeks. In 
addition, the company has a system of bonuses to reward the workers taking long trips. The 
pay rate cost modifier in Table 13. 
 
Table 12: Daily shift options with associated costs 
Daily shift alternatives:  
# of workers for 
continuous 
service 
 
pay 
rate, 
CU/day 
(1) 8 hours of work, 16 hours of 
rest  
(2) 12 hours of work, 12 hours of 
rest 
3 
2 
125 
250 
 
Table 13: Trip alternatives with cost modifier 
Trip alternatives: 
 
 
# of weeks 
 
pay rate cost 
modifier 
(1)  1-week trip 1 
(2)  2-weeks trip 1.25 
(3)  4-weeks trip 1.5 
(4)  6-weeks trip 2 
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Table 14: Repair times for the subsystems of Line heater 
Repair times: 
 
 
      # subsystems 
 
             time [h] 
 Temperature Sensors, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝑇𝑆  1 
 Flame Detector, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝐹𝐷  1 
 Programmable Logic Controllers, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝑃𝐿𝐶  4 
 Safety Valves (SV1, SV2, SV3), 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟
𝑆𝑉  2 
 
The alternatives of devices for subsystems with corresponding characteristics are given 
in the below.  
The following alternatives are given for the subsystems; temperature sensors in Table 15, 
flame detectors in Table 16, programmable logic controllers in Table 17 and for the safety 
valves in Table 18.  
Additionally, the percentage of spare part cost fraction- 𝜎 is fixed for the subsystems given 
as 20%, 30%, and 20%, respectively.  
 
Table 15: Data for the subsystem, temperature sensors (TS) 
Alternatives: TT1 TT2 TT3 TT4 TT5 
Dangerous failure rate, 
[𝟏 𝒉]⁄  
2
∙ 10−5 
2,86
∙ 10−5 
5 ∙ 10−5 9 ∙ 10−7 7,14
∙ 10−7 
Spurious trip rate, [𝟏 𝒉]⁄  10−5 10−5 4,6
∙ 10−6 
4,6
∙ 10−7 
4,8 ∙ 10−7 
Diagnostic coverage, % 60 60 89 80 90 
Purchase cost, CU 400 250 750 1000 1500 
Design cost, CU  30 15 15 13 14 
Installation cost, CU 15 18 15 13 12 
Consumption cost, per 
year CU 
20 8 18 15 10 
Maintenance cost, per 
year CU 
200 150 125 125 135 
Repair cost, per hour CU 5 5 5 5 6 
Test cost, CU 5 5 5 4 5 
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Table 16: Data for the subsystem, flame detectors (FD) 
Alternatives: FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 
Dangerous failure rate, 
[𝟏 𝒉]⁄  
10−5 1,67
∙ 10−5 
6,67 ∙ 10−6 5,43 ∙ 10−6 
Spurious trip rate, [𝟏 𝒉]⁄  10−5 10−5 3 ∙ 10−6 10−6 
Diagnostic coverage, % 75 80 80 85 
Purchase cost, CU 600 400 1000 1050 
Design cost, CU  25 20 5 5 
Installation cost, CU 25 25 5 5 
Consumption cost, per 
year CU 
10 12 12 12 
Maintenance cost, per 
year CU 
100 100 50 50 
Repair cost, per hour CU 5 5 5 5 
Test cost, CU 4 3 3 3 
 
 
Table 17: Data for the subsystem, PLCs 
Alternatives: PLC1 PLC2 PLC3 
Dangerous failure rate, 
[𝟏 𝒉]⁄  
9,11 ∙ 10−7 1,25 ∙ 10−6 5,96 ∙ 10−6 
Spurious trip rate, [𝟏 𝒉]⁄  8,33 ∙ 10−7 1,09 ∙ 10−6 5,5 ∙ 10−6 
Diagnostic coverage, % 90 98 97 
Purchase cost, CU 22500 12500 7500 
Design cost, CU  2000 1000 600 
Installation cost, CU 500 250 500 
Consumption cost, per 
year CU 
500 500 400 
Maintenance cost, per 
year CU 
200 250 200 
Repair cost, per hour CU 5 5 5 
Test cost, CU 100 100 75 
 
 
   
 
79 
 
Table 18: Data for safety valves (SVs) 
Alternatives: SV1 SV2 SV3 
Dangerous failure rate, 
[𝟏 𝒉]⁄  
6,67 ∙ 10−5 3,6 ∙ 10−7 9 ∙ 10−6 
Spurious trip rate, [𝟏 𝒉]⁄  3,33 ∙ 10−5 1,8 ∙ 10−7 5 ∙ 10−6 
Diagnostic coverage, % 20 75 30 
Purchase cost, CU 1300 1750 1400 
Design cost, CU  650 900 900 
Installation cost, CU 500 250 500 
Consumption cost, per 
year CU 
250 200 100 
Maintenance cost, per 
year CU 
50 50 50 
Repair cost, per hour CU 45 40 25 
Test cost, CU 50 50 50 
 
The alternatives of voting architectures (redundancy) are given for subsystems, in Table 19. 
The repair rate for a subsystem is estimated as  𝜇 = 0,125 [ℎ−1] due to the constraint on the 
repair time maximum 8 hours.  
The restoration rate for the technology is given as 𝜇𝑡 = 0,0625 [ℎ−1].  
Regarding the Common Cause Failure factor 𝛽, the following data is given: 
 𝛽 = 0,02 is given for the solution of additional electrical separation of devices 
 𝛽 = 0,05 is given for the solution of electrical separation of the circuits of devices 
The different cost modifiers are defined for the decision-making on the additional electrical 
separation, in Table 20.  
The duration of the lifecycle of the systems is assumed as 12 years.  
The start-up cost is 2 500 000[𝐶𝑈], cost of hazard is 125 000 000[𝐶𝑈], and production losses 
is 500 000[𝐶𝑈/ℎ].  
The start-up time 𝑇𝑆𝑈 ,  after the shutdown necessary for maintenance before the 
technology can be restarted is 12 hours, and the losses of shutdown are estimated 250 
[𝐶𝑈/ℎ].   
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The discount factor for the cost model, 𝛿 is given 5% (0, 05).  
Table 19: MooN architectures for the subsystems 
Subsystems Voting architectures (M-out-of-N) 
Temperature sensor (TS)    1oo1; 1oo2; 1oo3; 1oo4; 1oo5 
Flame detector (FD)                        1oo1; 1oo2; 1oo3 
Logic solver controllers (PLC)                        1oo1; 1oo2; 1oo3; 1oo4; 2oo3 
Final control elements (SVs)                        1oo1; 1oo2; 1oo3; 1oo4 
 
Table 20: Cost modifiers for additional electrical separation 
Subsystems Standard value Additional electrical 
separation 
Purchase cost modifier, 𝜷𝒑𝒖𝒓𝒄𝒉 1 1,15 
Design cost modifier, 𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 1                    1 
Consumption cost modifier, 𝜷𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 1 1,3 
 
 
6.0 Results and Analysis 
The results given by the solutions of multi-objective optimization problem are the Pareto-
front solutions presented below. These results represent the problem solving without 
imposing the restrictions on a SIL level for the developed solution.  
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Figure 19: Pareto-front solutions 
 
In Figure 19, Pareto-front of 71 solutions obtained as a result of the multi-objective 
optimization with gamultobj solver in Matlab. The optimization was run without the SIL3 
restrictions. When the SIL3 restrictions have been applied to the multi-objective 
optimization results, this produced eight solutions, which will be studied and discussed 
further. The solutions of the Markov model and lifecycle cost model for the defined objective 
functions (i.e. the outputs of the model) demonstrated in Table 21. 
The results obtained from the solutions of Markov model of the process, provide the 
following recommendations in Table 22 that can be used in the requirements specification, 
as a starting point to the detailed design of an engineering solution for safety system. In 
addition, “b” stands for baseline solution while “e” stands for additional electrical 
separation.  
For the given problem setting, the results show that the field devices, i.e., sensors and valves, 
with higher reliability characteristics are preferred despite their higher costs.  
In addition, the option, adding “additional electrical separation” for reducing the occurrence 
of common cause failure in the components is considered over the alternative. 
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Further, for the subsystem of temperature sensors, TT4 with 1oo2 architecture and TS5with 
1oo3 architecture are equally preferred. Compared to other alternatives, they are more 
expensive, but the optimization algorithm preferred them to the alternative due to their 
component reliability, see in Table 15 and Table 20.  
For the flame detectors, the alternative FD4 with 1oo3 architecture is preferred over the 
others, see in Table 16 and this 1oo3 is the highest redundancy architecture for such 
subsystem see Table 20.  In comparison to devices in other subsystems, flame detectors are 
generally cheaper.   
For the logic programmable controllers, the optimization algorithm suggested two 
alternatives such as PLC1 with 1oo2 and PLC2 with 1oo3, but the latter one is preferred, 
because it has a higher percentage of diagnostic coverage (98%) and its costs are reasonable 
compared to PLC1, see Table 18.   
For the subsystems of final controls, in this case safety valve, only one device model SV2 is 
preferred. Besides the two types of redundancy architectures are considered: architecture 
1oo3 for TI either 12 weeks correspond to 3 months, 16 weeks correspond to 3,5 months, 
and 24 weeks correspond to 4,5 months whereas architecture 1oo4 is for at least one valve 
subsystem  when TI is 24 weeks. 
 
Table 21: the outputs of the optimization model 
# 𝑷𝑭𝑫𝒂𝒗𝒈 DT, [h] 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒚𝒄𝒍𝒆,[CU 
1 1,509 ∙ 10−7 1245 14 141 224,90 
2 2,917 ∙ 10−7 705 12 478 522,65 
3 2,720 ∙ 10−7 705 12 809 454,25 
4 2,649 ∙ 10−7 933 14 144 003,47 
5 2,673 ∙ 10−7 629 15 148 724,01 
6 5,014 ∙ 10−7 518 12 783 512,95 
7 4,364 ∙ 10−7 580 12 366 906,19 
8 4,290 ∙ 10−7 518 13 712 005,72 
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Table 22: Optimization results: Recommendations for the subsystems of SIS 
 
 
Regarding the maintenance policies, the algorithm decided that PLCs should be maintained 
in parallel. This decision might be taken due to its largest repair time, see Table 14.  
For the temperature sensors both policies are applied equally, but at least one of the 
temperature sensors subsystems should be maintained in sequential when TI is 24 weeks.  
For the safety valves, the parallel testing is applied when TI is 24 weeks, considering the 
higher repair time for valves compared to other field devices, Table 14. This also may be 
attributed to the large number of workers required for parallel testing.  
Regarding the workforce scheduling, during the normal operations four workers are required 
to be present at the facility to monitor and do the continuous maintenance. This demand is 
mostly covered by 4-week trips with 8 hours of work and 16 hours of rest correspond to 3 
workers, see Table 12 and Table 13. 
For proof test, more workers are required. The number of workers depends on the 
maintenance policy either parallel or sequential. This number varies between 9 and 18.  
The work schedule for maintenance workers during proof tests is covered by 1 week trip 
with 12 hours work and 12 hours of rest, this schedule corresponds to a crew consists of two 
workers, in Table 15. The optimization algorithm appears to keep the total number of 
workers required fewer than 20.   
# Temperature 
Sensor (TT) 
Flame 
Detector (FD) 
 
PLC 
Safety 
Valve1 (SV1) 
Safety 
Valve2 (SV2) 
Safety 
Valve3 (SV3) 
TI 
[w] 
1 {TS4; 1oo2; e; seq} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; e; seq} {SV2; 1oo3; e; seq} {SV2; 1oo3; e; par} 12 
2 {TS4; 1oo2; e; seq} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC1; 1oo2; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; e; seq} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑠𝑒𝑞} 16 
3 {TS4; 1oo2; e; seq} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; e; seq} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑠𝑒𝑞} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 16 
4 {TS5; 1oo3; e; par} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; e; par} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑠𝑒𝑞} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 16 
5 {TS5; 1oo3; e; par} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; e; par} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜4; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 16 
6 {TS4; 1oo2; e; par} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC1; 1oo2; e; par} {SV2; 1oo3; b; par} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜4; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 24 
7 {TS5; 1oo3; e; seq} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo4; e; par} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 24 
8 {TS5; 1oo3; e; par} {FD4; 1oo3; e; seq} {PLC2; 1oo3; e; par} {SV2; 1oo4; e; par} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜3; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} {𝑆𝑉2; 1𝑜𝑜4; 𝑒; 𝑝𝑎𝑟} 24 
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In addition, the importance of workforce considerations is that the costs associated with 
maintenance personnel salaries and their transportation costs are a significant share (more 
than 90%, see COST labor in Table 23 ) of the operational expenditures of the safety system 
in this particular case. The cost estimations of the results are shown in below Table 23. 
Table 23: Costs of the safety system 
 
Overall, the obtained results given the multi-objective problem are “a Pareto-front” of 
optimal solutions for the problem, which similar to the one in (Redutskiy 2017a).  However, 
expanded with personnel organization issues (e.g. work schedule, staffing size, personnel 
transport, etc.) which influences the Markov model of the process (e.g. incidents/repairs and 
failures/restorations), and the life cycle cost model. 
7.0 Conclusions   
The petroleum industry is facing a shift towards the operations in unpredictable 
environments and remote locations; therefore, the processes in such conditions must run 
smoothly and be economically efficient. The development and operation of automated safety 
systems (i.e. IT-solutions) are crucial to the oil and gas processes in such circumstance. The 
decisions related to the safety systems design (include the architectures and the 
instrumentation choices for the system’s components), and maintaining the safety systems 
as well as the facility’s personnel and their transportation to the remote locations and back 
are highly considerable. Because these issues are the main cost drivers to the capital 
investments into the safety systems. This thesis addressed the issues related to the design 
and maintenance planning of the safety system, in this case a small-automated ESD system, 
  COST LIFECYCLE COST PROCUREMENT COST OPERATIONS COST 
RISK 
total incl. COST labor 
1 14 141 224,90 2 142 833,53 11 998 371,10 10 875 683,98 20,27 
2 12 478 522,65 2 030 149,73 10 448 336,25 9 473 656,59 36,66 
3 12 809 454,25 2 033 915,56 10 775 504,32 9 797 482,06 34,37 
4 14 144 003,47 2 077 557,04 12 066 412,04 11 059 721,52 34,39 
5 15 148 724,01 1 903 904,68 13 244 768,70 12 277 563,03 50,63 
6 12 783 512,95 1 997 469,01 10 785 978,05 9 996 526,06 65,89 
7 12 366 906,19 1 588 585,56 10 778 278,38 9 990 363,62 42,25 
8 13 712 005,72 1 706 361,17 12 005 599,22 11 127 316,23 45,33 
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with a focus on workforce scheduling for remotely located oil and gas processing facilities. 
Therefore, the objective of this research has been to address the problem of SIS design and 
maintenance modelling to optimize the set of safety measures inherent in the SIS and 
simultaneously to determine the staffing size and their working schedules as well as the 
maintenance policy for SIS performance. The multi-objective optimization of the SIS design 
and maintenance planning considered both safety and economic indicators in order to 
explore the trade-off between the cost of using safety measures and the obtained safety level 
for SIS performance.  
The modelling in this research is to ensure the safety of operations by simultaneously 
evaluating the decisions on the safety system`s components and structures, the facility 
maintenance frequencies, the staffing size of maintenance personnel and transportation of 
staff, as well as the schedules of their work shift. The Markov model applied for safety 
quantification, i.e. addressing the device failures and repairs, technological incidents and 
restorations, and the periodic maintenance policy, while a black-box optimization algorithm 
was used in the decision-making process. This research based on the results obtained from 
the optimization models provides a conceptual framework in Figure 20 that points the 
importance of SIS design and aims to contribute to the decisions made by the E&P operators 
(engineering department) and the engineering design contractors regarding the formulation 
of straightforward requirements for the safety systems. This suggested decision-making 
approach is not only for formulating requirements specification but also advisable to use as 
a basis for detailed engineering design as well as a research for reasonable engineering 
solutions. The solution methods and models that are used in this research can be transferable 
to other process industries, considering the safety system problems.  
 
Figure 20: A conceptual framework for SIS design and maintenance planning 
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7.1 Research limitations 
The limitations of this research might be as follows. Firstly, regarding the safety system 
design, the diverse redundancy is not considered for the subsystems, as well as aging of the 
system out of consideration. Secondly, some limitations relates to the maintenance planning. 
Refer to the literature review, in 2.4.5, several strategies can be applied to the proof tests, 
and this research is limited to only partial and sequential. Another limitation relates to 
workforce scheduling, the consideration of maintenance crews is only on the E&P operator 
side, i.e. the issues on contractor`s side not considered at all.  Since there are several 
automated control systems, which also need to be maintained, installed on the oil and gas 
facility there will be need for more workers to do the necessary maintenance.  
 
7.2 Further research  
For the further research, considering diverse redundancy (e.g. different devices into a 
subsystem) for the subsystems in the modelling can improve the proposed model. The aging 
of the system must be taken into account in the modelling regarding to system reliability 
(failure rate in 3.2.1.2 and Figure 10). For the maintenance planning, introducing more 
detailed proof testing policies can improve the models, and the workforce scheduling may 
be modelled other than a set-covering problem. As seen during the computational 
experiment 6.1, the genetic algorithm is not quite efficient, thus, developing a heuristic for 
this particular problem is recommended.  From the logistics perspective, introducing inter 
modal options for transportation of the maintenance crew in the model that could be a 
research direction, which will be especially relevant for offshore locations. For the remotely 
located O&G facilities, transporting the maintenance crews to and from the facilities cost 
significantly. Thus, the expanding the transportation cost in the modelling can ensure more 
reliable proposed approach to the design decisions of safety systems.  
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